California, Are You There? It\u27s the Entertainment Industry Calling and We Need Net Neutrality by Young, Olivia
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law 
Review 
Volume 40 Number 2 Article 3 
Spring 4-10-2020 
California, Are You There? It's the Entertainment Industry Calling 
and We Need Net Neutrality 
Olivia Young 
LMU Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, olivia.young@lls.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Olivia Young, California, Are You There? It's the Entertainment Industry Calling and We Need Net 
Neutrality, 40 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 247 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol40/iss2/3 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ 
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles 
Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and 
Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/20 12:27 PM 
 
247 
CALIFORNIA, ARE YOU THERE? IT’S THE 
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CALLING AND WE 
NEED NET NEUTRALITY 
Olivia Young* 
With online streaming rapidly replacing cable as the preferred method 
of media consumption for viewers, demand for online content is at an all-
time high.  Behind the scenes of the entertainment evolution is an open and 
neutral Internet that facilitates equal access to all online content.  Until re-
cently, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) committed to pre-
serving the neutral net by passing Net Neutrality regulations that prohibited 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from blocking, throttling, or prioritizing 
online content.  That changed on December 14, 2017, when the FCC re-
pealed Net Neutrality, lifting the restrictions that once prevented ISPs from 
differentially transmitting online content.  ISPs are now free to create a hier-
archy of content prioritization that favors the content they own and the con-
tent hosted by streaming services capable of paying the greatest prioritization 
fees.  This hierarchy has the potential to reduce innovation in the online 
streaming service industry by creating financial barriers to entry that keep 
smaller streaming services out, limiting the diversity of content accessible 
by consumers. 
This Note first describes the history of the Internet’s regulation that 
preceded Net Neutrality’s repeal, then explains the repeal’s potential conse-
quences on online streaming services and consumers.  Next, this Note offers 
solutions to Net Neutrality’s repeal.  Finally, this Note concludes with a call 
to action, encouraging those who care about the future of a neutral Internet 
to not stand idle. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to begin 
by thanking her parents for supplying endless love, support, and cups of tea throughout the writing 
of this piece.  The author would also like to thank her advisor, Professor Karl Manheim, for his 
feedback, guidance, and encouragement, as well as the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law 
Review editorial board for making the publication of this piece possible.  Finally, the author would 
like to thank her friend, Elise Creighton, for not only serving as an incredible source of friendship 
over the past thirteen years, but for introducing her to the importance of Net Neutrality and em-
boldening her to do something about its repeal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 29, 1969, UCLA Professor Leonard Kleinrock, assisted by 
programmer Charley Kline, sent the first “host-to-host” message over the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANet) ever recorded.1  
The ARPANet, a precursor to the Internet whose simple network included 
only a handful of universities, carried the message from UCLA to Stanford 
Research Institute.2  The first message read, “lo.”3  About an hour later, the 
second message read “login.”4  Fast-forward fifty years to 2019, the AR-
PANet has been replaced by the Internet, hosts 3.7 billion users, and boasts 
an estimated 6.35 billion indexed web pages.5  Google alone processes more 
than 40,000 transmissions per second.6  The modern Internet has evolved 
from its humble beginnings as a small series of interconnected computers, to 
a massive global network comprised of hundreds of thousands of networks 
across the world.7  
The Internet has become “a catalyst of innovation,” not only creating 
its own industry but also igniting change and expansion in others.8  One in-
dustry which has experienced particular growth and change as a result has 
 
1. Leonard Kleinrock, History of Communications, IEEE COMM. MAG., Aug. 2010, at 26, 
32. 
2. Id. at 26, 32. 
3. Id. at 32. 
4. 45 Years Ago: First Message Sent over the Internet, CBS NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014, 12:55 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/first-message-sent-over-the-internet-45-years-ago/ [https://
perma.cc/AU6G-2XSL]. 
5. Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Eve-
ryone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernard-
marr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-
should-read/#3268714760ba [https://perma.cc/4R45-V2YD]; The Size of the World Wide Web (The 
Internet), WORLDWIDEWEBSIZE.COM, https://www.worldwidewebsize.com [https://perma.cc
/A8Q9-2BUJ]. 
6. Marr, supra note 5. 
7. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Internet History, INT’L J. OF TECHNOETHICS, Apr.–June 2011, 
at 45, 57–58. 
8. Lynn St. Amour, The Internet: An Unprecedented and Unapparelled Platform for Inno-
vation and Change, 157 (Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012); Derek Slater & Patricia Wruuk, We Are All 
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been the entertainment industry.9  With the introduction of online video 
streaming, modern consumers are abandoning traditional methods of film 
and television consumption for an online experience they can customize to 
match their taste, viewing schedule, and bank account.10  Popularly labeled 
“cord cutters,” these modern consumers are swapping out their cable and 
satellite contracts for accounts with subscription-based online streaming pro-
viders such as Netflix or Hulu.11  Much like cable began to replace free 
broadcast as the preferred method of television consumption starting in the 
1950s, online streaming services are now taking over as viewers choose to 
log in instead of tune in.12 
The technology necessary to facilitate this change in media consump-
tion was first made available in 2007, when Netflix released its streaming 
service.13  However, the dramatic increase in online streaming has been more 
recent.14  While this upward trend can be partially explained by increased 
audience familiarity with online streaming technology and increased access 
to the Internet, there are other factors that come in to play.15  One such factor 
is the perceived relative advantage of streaming content online.16  The rela-
tive advantage of an innovation is “the degree to which [it] is perceived as 
 
Content Creators Now: Measuring Creativity and Innovation in the Digital Economy, 163 
(Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012). 
9. Derek Slater & Patricia Wruuk, We Are All Content Creators Now: Measuring Creativity 
and Innovation in the Digital Economy, 163 (Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012). 
10. See Arne Alsin, The Future of Media: Disruptions, Revolutions and The Quest for Dis-
tribution, FORBES (July 19, 2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aalsin/2018/07/19/the-
future-of-media-disruptions-revolutions-and-the-quest-for-distribution/#14043fab60b9 [https://
perma.cc/66JE-T548]. 
11. Alec Tefertiller, Media Substitution in Cable Cord-Cutting: The Adoption of Web-
Streaming Television, 62 J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 390, 390 (2018). 
12. History of Cable, CAL. CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS’N, https://www.calcable.org/learn
/history-of-cable/ [https://perma.cc/W2LA-A4UA]. 
13. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 402. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 402–03. 
16. Id. at 401–03. 
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better than the idea it supersedes.”17  In a study into the cord-cutting phe-
nomenon published in 2018, researchers found that consumers perceive 
online video streaming as more advantageous than traditional methods of 
viewing television, preferring a television viewing experience that “mir-
ror[s]” their general user experience online.18  Thus, viewers want to play an 
active role in choosing and streaming the content they watch, and want the 
opportunity to stay online to connect with friends while doing so.19 
The entertainment industry’s evolution is attributable to an unrestricted 
Internet that facilitates competition, innovation, and growth.20  Often de-
scribed as an “open architecture,” the Internet allows users to freely com-
municate with each other globally.21  This freedom “has opened markets be-
yond the traditional geographic limitations,” and allowed start-ups like 
Spotify and YouTube to enter their respective markets and scale globally.22  
Unfortunately, this “open Internet” may soon become a relic of the past.23   
In 2017, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)24 voted to 
pass the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIFO).25  RIFO eliminated the 
restrictions on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that the FCC put in place in 
 
17. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 15 (4th ed. 1995) (explaining that 
this factor, when measured in the general public, may be used to predict the rate at which an inno-
vation will be adopted). 
18. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 396, 398–400, 403. 
19. Id. at 403. 
20. Florian Schaub, The Implications of the FCC’s Net Neutrality Repeal, 6 COGITATIO 
PRESS 69, 69 (2018). 
21. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium: The 
Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age, at 3 (Feb. 8, 
2004). 
22. Id. 
23. Schaub, supra note 20, at 71. 
24. About the FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview [https://perma.cc/NN6Y-T68M] 
(describing the FCC as “[a]n independent U.S. government agency overseen by Congress, the Com-
mission is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing America’s communica-
tions law and regulations.”). 
25. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 311, 531 (2018). 
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2015 and reclassified the Internet under Title I.26  The restrictions prohibited 
ISPs from “blocking, throttling, and [engaging in] prepaid-prioritization,” 
and worked to preserve the Internet as an open and non-discriminatory re-
source accessible by all; a concept captured by the term “net neutrality” 
coined by Columbia law professor, Tim Wu.27  Blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization are all ways in which an ISP may restrict consumer access to 
content online.  If an ISP blocks content, for example, a consumer generally 
is unable to access it.28  If, instead, an ISP throttles a website, the website 
will still be accessible by consumers but will take much longer to load.29  
ISPs may use throttling to profit through paid prioritization agreements.30  A 
content provider who enters into a paid prioritization agreement with an ISP 
agrees to pay the ISP a fee to increase the speed at which consumers are able 
to access the content provider’s website.31  The FCC’s restrictions on these 
behaviors, which were adopted to preserve the Internet’s open architecture 
and encourage innovation, have officially been removed.32 
By eliminating these restrictions and thereby repealing net neutrality, 
the FCC has placed the future of the Internet into the hands of ISPs.33  With 
ISPs possessing concentrated power over the Internet’s distribution, control 
over consumers’ ability to access content online falls into the hands of a few 
 
26. Id. at 318, 466–67, 495. 
27. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5627, 5647 (2015); 
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
141, 145 (2003). 
28. Daphne Keller, A Glossary of Internet Content Blocking Tools, CENTER FOR INTERNET 
AND SOCY, (Jan. 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2018/01/glossary-internet-
content-blocking-tools [https://perma.cc/C3FP-DEW6]. 
29. Tim Fisher, What Is Bandwidth?, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com
/what-is-bandwidth-2625809 [https://perma.cc/2V67-FJSW]. 
30. Katherine Trendacosta, Busting Two Myths About Pair Prioritization, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/busting-two-myths-
about-paid-prioritization [https://perma.cc/KM7S-8UJQ]. 
31. Id. 
32. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5618–34; Restoring In-
ternet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 411 (2018) (describing how the Internet’s reclassification un-
der Title I removed the FCC’s “statutory authority to impose market-wide prophylactic regula-
tion[s]” on to ISPs). 
33. Schaub, supra note 20, at 70. 
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major corporations.34  What Net Neutrality’s repeal will mean for the enter-
tainment industry is unknown at this time.35  While proponents of RIFO ar-
gue that the Internet’s deregulation will encourage investment into broad-
band services, thus creating jobs and encouraging innovation,36 this outlook 
seems overly optimistic. 
 As the number of consumers online continues to increase, upgrades to 
the Internet’s infrastructure are inevitable.37  Growing interest in nationwide 
Internet services require ISPs to expand their infrastructure into rural areas.38  
Those in favor of Net Neutrality’s abolishment argue that ISPs will lack an 
incentive to engage in such expansion if unable to charge websites prioriti-
zation fees.39  However, this argument fails to consider that ISPs lack the 
financial incentive to service rural areas in the first place.40  As of 2016, ap-
 
34. There are three tiers into which ISPs are divided.  Tier three houses companies like 
Comcast that provide Internet services directly to consumers and businesses, referred to as end-
users, in exchange for a fee.  Tier two houses ISPs which are “specialized in data transmission, 
such as routers.”  Tier one (also referred to as level one) is comprised of the ISPs which, through 
their creation of the Internet’s physical infrastructure, form the “backbone” of the Internet on which 
all other ISPs rely.  MARK WINTHER, TIER 1 ISPS: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY THEY ARE 
IMPORTANT 1, 4–5 (2006).  Given the prohibitively high cost of installing this infrastructure, there 
are financial barriers to entry which limit the number of providers offering these services.  Margil 
A. Vanberg, Internet Regulation: Monopolist Bottlenecks in Internet Service Markets?, 1, 2, 19, 
21–22 (June 2003). 
35. Francis Dinha, Reflecting on One Year Without Net Neutrality, FORBES (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/06/25/reflecting-on-one-year-without-net-
neutrality/#46f015374edc [https://perma.cc/86JB-F3BK]. 
36. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 529, 530 (2018) (Chairman Ajit Pai 
describing how the Internet’s classification and regulation under Title II has “impeded innovation” 
and reduced investment into the expansion of Internet services which, in turn, resulted in fewer 
jobs); see also Schaub, supra note 20, at 70. 
37. Hsing Kenneth Cheng et al., The Debate on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective, 22 
INFO. SYSTEMS RES. 1, 4 (2011). 
38. See id. at 2, 4. 
39. Id. 
40. See Marguerite Reardon, Why Rural Areas Can’t Catch a Break on Speedy Broadband, 
CNET (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-rural-areas-cant-catch-a-break-on-
speedy-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/8S6W-YV5X]. 
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proximately thirty-nine percent of individuals living in rural areas lacked in-
ternet access.41  Creating the infrastructure necessary to service individuals 
living in rural areas is prohibitively expensive, and once it is created, the 
number of consumers who will pay to access it could be relatively few.42  In 
essence, hoping that ISPs will choose to invest some of the revenue they 
generate through prioritization agreements into the expansion of Internet ser-
vices to rural areas, when they lack a financial incentive to do so, appears 
misguided.43 
ISPs possess a financial incentive to use their newfound abilities to dis-
criminate against, prioritize, and prohibit access to content at the cost of in-
novation.44  RIFO does not prevent ISPs from creating hierarchies of content 
prioritization based on the amount that each streaming service is able to pay, 
while creating separate payment hierarchies for consumers that will deter-
mine their ability to access these sites.45  This enables ISPs to “charge twice 
for the same service: their subscribers for Internet access and content pro-
viders for making sure that their data actually reaches the ISP’s subscrib-
ers.”46 
Furthermore, ISPs who offer their own online streaming services have 
a financial incentive to make it easier for consumers to access content on the 
platforms they own, directing their customers away from competing ser-
vices.47  Through the acquisition of content providers like NBC Universal 
and Time Warner, ISPs are beginning to enter the content production busi-
ness.48  By offering their subscribers lower access fees, ISPs will entice con-
sumers to use their streaming service instead of services owned by a com-
petitor.49  In addition, ISPs will dissuade financially-strapped start-ups from 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 70. 
47. Id. at 71. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 70–71. 
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entering the online streaming market.50  This, in turn, will stifle innovation 
and reduce content diversity, allowing the largest and most financially-
equipped companies to maintain the most market control.51  Ultimately, con-
sumers may find that they no longer play an active role in their media con-
sumption,52 with their streaming preferences taking a back seat to the prior-
ities of their ISP. 
This Article identifies and analyzes the potential consequences of Net 
Neutrality’s repeal on one of California’s most iconic industries: entertain-
ment.  Taking into account the current state of Internet regulation, this Note 
examines and explores the ways in which ISPs’ newfound ability to block, 
throttle, and prioritize content could impact online streaming services and 
consumers.  Specifically, this Article argues that ISPs have the motivation 
and means to create financial barriers to entry into the online streaming ser-
vice market using their control over content access.53  These barriers will 
limit market entry by start-ups, which will stifle innovation and growth in 
the entertainment industry as a whole, where online streaming has become 
the preferred method of media consumption.54  As stated by former FCC 
Chairman, Michael K. Powell: “Internet Freedom . . . promotes innovation 
by giving developers and service providers confidence that they can develop 
broadband applications that reach consumers and run as designed.”55  With 
this freedom now compromised, a solution must be found. 
Part II of this Note retraces the evolution of the Internet from the time 
of its formation to the modern day, and the various regulatory frameworks 
which have accompanied its growth.  Part III will discuss the potential con-
 
50. Id. 
51. See Jenny Odegard, What Net Neutrality Changes Could Mean For Your Small Busi-
ness, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 4:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennyodegard/2017/12/04
/what-net-neutrality-changes-could-mean-for-your-small-business/#528ccb1056a1 [https://
perma.cc/T34D-7BL3]. 
52. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 403. 
53. See, e,g., Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71 (describing how ISPs have historically, 
“abus[ed] their powerful position as mediators between content (or edge) providers and consum-
ers,” and are likely to continue to do so after Net Neutrality’s repeal by entering into expensive 
prioritization agreements with content providers that smaller providers may have difficulty paying). 
54. See id. at 70–71. 
55. Powell, supra note 21, at 6. 
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sequences of the non-neutral net on the entertainment industry, with a spe-
cific focus on how online streaming services could be affected by blocking, 
throttling, and paid prioritization efforts by ISPs.  Part IV explores the efforts 
of states and private organizations in overturning or otherwise avoiding the 
implications of Net Neutrality’s repeal.  This Section offers various alterna-
tive solutions that may be available in the absence of protective legislation.  
Part V concludes this Note with a call to action, encouraging all who care 
about the future of an open and unrestricted net to no longer stand idle.   
II. BACKGROUND 
This Section provides a timeline of the Internet’s growth and regula-
tion.  Beginning with the 1934 Communications Act, this Section will detail 
the FCC’s creation and its jurisdiction over communications services.  Fol-
lowing an introduction to the ARPANet, and its first successful transmission 
in 1969, this Section examines the FCC orders, congressional acts, and court 
cases which have contributed the Internet’s expansion. 
A. Creation of the FCC and Initial Classifications of Computer 
Services 
The FCC was created by Congress in the 1934 Communications Act 
(the “1934 Act”).56  The 1934 Act placed “communication by wire,” which 
at this time included telephone and telegraph services, under the FCC’s pur-
view.57  The 1934 Act represented two significant changes in the way com-
munication by wire had previously been regulated.  First, by transferring au-
thority over the telephone and telegraph industries to the FCC, the 1934 Act 
took away the regulatory control over these industries that states had enjoyed 
 
56. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2019). 
57. Roger Heinrich, Federal Radio Commission, MIDDLE TENN. ST. U., https://
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/809/federal-radio-commission [https://perma.cc/A36D-
GL8J]. 
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prior to 1934.58  Second, by classifying radio communication and communi-
cation by wire under separate titles, the 1934 Act seemingly created a dis-
tinction between these two communication services.59 
The 1934 Act is divided into multiple titles.60  The first, Title I, grants 
the FCC general jurisdiction to regulate certain communications industries.61  
Title I also gives the FCC ancillary jurisdiction to “make available . . . to all 
the people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service,” and “perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be neces-
sary in the execution of its functions.”62  Title I ancillary jurisdiction allows 
the FCC to “promulgate regulations to effectuate the goals and provisions of 
the Act even in the absence of an explicit grant of regulatory authority, if the 
regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s specific statutory 
powers and responsibilities.”63  Thus, under certain circumstances, the FCC 
may use its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I to increase its limited regula-
tory authority over Title I communications services.64 
Title II of the 1934 Act details the FCC’s power to regulate telecom-
munications services.65  Providers of these services, “common carriers,”66 
include “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or 
 
58. See DIANE S. KATZ & DR. THEODORE BOLENA, CROSSED LINES: REGULATORY 
MISSTEPS IN TELECOM POLICY at 2 (2003). 
59. See generally Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201 (2019) (placing 
telecommunications regulations under the “Title II—Common Carriers” heading, and placing radio 
communications regulations under the “Title III—Provisions Related To Radio” heading). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. In 1934, the FCC’s jurisdiction extended over the telecommunications and radio 
communications industries. The FCC’s jurisdiction under the 1934 Act has since expanded to en-
compass new advancements in communications technologies such as cable television and Internet 
services. 
62. Id.; § 154(i). 
63. American Library Ass’n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
64. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
65. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2019). 
66. Id. 
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foreign communication by wire or radio or . . . [the] foreign radio transmis-
sion of energy,” but not “radio broadcasting.”67  Classification of a service 
provider as a common carrier under Title II gives the FCC “express and ex-
pansive authority” to regulate the provider.68  When a service provider is 
classified under Title II, the provider must comply with “such rules and reg-
ulations” as the Commission deems necessary to advance the “public inter-
est” in receiving the service.69  By definition, the 1934 Act made Title II 
applicable only to telecommunications carriers, or more specifically, AT&T 
who possessed widespread market control over the telecommunications in-
dustry at the time.70  Thus, in providing the FCC with substantial regulatory 
authority under Title II, Congress ensured that the Commission would be 
capable of creating regulations that would make sure telecommunications 
services, like that offered by AT&T, were accessible by all.71 
The 1934 Act serves as an early example of the Federal Government’s 
push to exercise control over communication technologies.  This control 
would be tested as these technologies continued to expand with new innova-
tions.72  Following the first transmission in 1969 over the Internet’s precur-
sor, ARPANet, the FCC was presented with a new form of communications 
services not previously encountered: those facilitated via computers.73  In 
response, the FCC produced the Computer Inquiries, a series of decisions 
beginning in 1970 which sought to classify computer services under Title I 
and II of the 1934 Act.74  In its first decision, Computer Inquiries I, the FCC 
 
67. Id. § 153(11). 
68. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). 
69. See 47 U.S.C. § 201. 
70. See Katz & Bolena, supra note 58, at 7–9. 
71. See id. at 8. 
72. See, e.g., Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s 
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 173–74, 181–83 (2003) (describing how technolog-
ical advancements in computer processing raised questions as to the classification of these advance-
ments under the 1934 Act, ultimately requiring that the FCC define and redefine various aspects of 
computer processing to fit under either Title I or Title II). 
73. Id. at 167, 170–73. 
74. Id. at 173–74. 
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faced a predicament.75  AT&T was utilizing computers to facilitate data pro-
cessing in connection with the basic communication services they offered at 
the time.76  Here, the new service being offered, data processing, was unreg-
ulated but dependent on the heavily regulated provision of telecommunica-
tions services.77  The FCC took action by creating a distinction between com-
puters, which “facilitated the operation of the communications network and 
. . . computers with which humans interacted.”78  The level of regulation to 
be applied and the common carrier participation in data processing were both 
topics at the heart of the FCC’s classification debate.79  Ultimately, the FCC 
found that “[t]he pure data processing market was . . . an innovative, com-
petitive market with low barriers to entry and little chance of monopoliza-
tion.”80  Thus, the Commission determined that the data processing market 
did not require safeguards to prevent unfair competition.81  The same could 
not be said of computers used purely to facilitate communications which the 
FCC found to be susceptible to monopolistic behavior and necessitating reg-
ulation.82 
In 1972, the first public demonstration of the ARPANet increased pub-
lic interest in this new technology.83  Although the ARPANet was originally 
intended only to facilitate resource-sharing, its messaging capabilities began 
exploiting the creation of electronic mail (now referred to as e-mail).84  This 
new innovation sparked the interest of thousands of consumers and became 
 
75. Id. at 170, 173. 
76. Id. at 174–75. 
77. Id. at 180–81. 
78. Id. at 173. 
79. See id. 
80. Id. at 175. 
81. Id. 
82. See id. 
83. KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE (THE ORIGINS 
OF THE INTERNET) 185–86 (1st ed. 1996). 
84. Id. at 189. 
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a driving force behind the ARPANet’s expansion.85  This growth presented 
new questions not accounted for by the FCC in Computer Inquiries I.86  The 
delineation between computers that “facilitated the operation of the commu-
nications network and . . . computers with which humans interacted,” set 
forth in Computer Inquiries I, was unsustainable.87  Each hybrid service cre-
ated required a case-by-case analysis by the FCC to determine its classifica-
tion, which became burdensome considering the new developments on the 
rise.88 
As a result, in 1976, the FCC returned to the drawing board and in its 
second decision, Computer Inquiries II, the FCC once again sought to clas-
sify computers based on their functions.89  This time, the agency drew a line 
between the “basic” transmission services offered by telecommunications 
providers, which were subject to greater regulations, and the “enhanced” ser-
vices offered by computer processing, which would be subject to less regu-
lation.90  Basic transmission services move information from one place to 
another, unaltered.91  The services, which include computer processing and 
memory storage, do not interact with “user supplied information.”92  By con-
trast, enhanced services, including data processing, are those computer ser-
vices that take a basic service and use it to alter the information being trans-
mitted.93  Put simply, “what goes into the network is different than what 
comes out of the network.”94  In its analysis, the FCC expressed that the 
public’s best interest would be served by allowing data processing services 
 
85. Id. 
86. Cannon, supra note 72, at 181–82. 
87. Id. at 173. 
88. Id. at 181. 
89. Id. 
90. See generally id. at 183–88. 
91. Id. at 183–84. 
92. Id. at 183. 
93. Id. at 185–86. 
94. Id. at 186 (citation omitted). 
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to continue flourishing in the open, competitive market without regulatory 
interference.95 
B. Expansion of the ARPANet 
The FCC’s prediction turned out to be valid, with the deregulation of 
the data processing services encouraging the early Internet’s continued ex-
pansion.96  As the budding Internet continued to grow, changes to its trans-
mission architecture were required to accommodate the increased number of 
networks hosted.97  In the early 1970s, the ARPANet was joined by other 
networks such as the Atlantic Packet Satellite Network (SATNet).98  The 
Network Control Protocol (NCP), which the ARPANet relied on to transmit 
information, was designed to only meet the specifications of the ARPANet’s 
network.99  It was incompatible with other networks that “had different in-
terfaces, different maximum packet sizes, and different transmission 
rates.”100  This limited the ARPANet’s connectivity across networks.101  Be-
ginning in 1983, the ARPANet migrated from the NCP to the new and im-
proved Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP).102  
This protocol migration represents a tremendous milestone in the Internet’s 
 
95. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 9 (FCC, Working Paper 
No. 31, 1999). 
96. Id. at 11–12 (describing how the FCC’s decision not to regulate data processing services 
transmitted over telecommunications lines resulted in the early internet’s “explosive growth”). 
97. Id. 
98. Hafner & Lyon, supra note 83, at 221, 222–23. 
99. Id. at 224. 
100. Id. 
101. See id. 
102. Id. at 248.  The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which focused only on trans-
mitting information (referred to as packets) from one user to another, was delivered in 1973.  The 
TCP increased network reliability by creating a transmission framework focused on moving pack-
ets from one user to another without deciphering the information itself.  Five years later, the portion 
of TCP dedicated to routing packets was separated into its own protocol, the Internet Protocol (IP).  
Under this new system, TCP would be responsible for, “breaking up messages into datagrams . . . 
detecting errors, resending anything that got lost,” and ensuring the information was in the right 
order, while IP was “responsible for routing individual diagrams.”  Id. at 226–27, 236. 
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history.103  In their book, Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the 
Internet, Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyons describe this event as follows: 
Without TCP, communication across networks couldn’t happen.  
If TCP could be perfected, anyone could build a network of any 
size or form, and as long as that network had a gateway computer 
that could interpret and route packets, it could communicate with 
any other network.  With TCP on the horizon, it was now obvious 
that networking had a future well beyond the experimental 
ARPANet.104 
As the ARPANet continued to expand, so did concerns that this market 
may fall victim to the stifling effects of concentrated control.105  In United 
States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, the court addressed 
whether an antitrust consent decree requiring AT&T’s divestiture should be 
entered given the provider’s widespread control over the telecommunica-
tions industry and its use of this power to disadvantage competitors.106  Here, 
the court recognized the FCC’s delineation between basic and enhanced ser-
vices set-forth in Computer Inquiries II.107  At the heart of this case was the 
concern that AT&T would use its concentrated power over the distribution 
of telecommunications services to monopolize the computer and computer-
related information markets.108  Ultimately, the court entered a modified an-
titrust consent decree, finding the divestiture of AT&T to be in the public 
interest by promoting competition in the “growing computer, computer-re-
lated, and information markets.”109 
 
103. Id. at 249. 
104. Id. at 227. 
105. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 171 (D.D.C. 
1982) (describing AT&T’s control over the interexchange market which is also known and referred 
to as the telecommunications market). 
106. Id. at 135, 223. 
107. Id. at 138 n.17. 
108. Id. at 179. 
109. Id. at 223, 226–27. 
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By 1984, the Internet hosted 1,024 computers, and academic interest in 
the ARPANet was on the rise.110  The open architecture of the ARPANet 
allowed anyone to connect to its network with no “special accommodations” 
required.111  During its initial growth, the ARPANet’s development was 
funded by the United States government.112  However, as civilian interest 
grew, so did budgetary constraints, so the government began engaging with 
private companies to take over.113  By 1993, the Federal Networking Coun-
cil, comprised of various government agencies involved in networking, se-
lected the National Science Foundation (NSF) to “assume responsibilities for 
non-military Internet registration.”114  NSF awarded a five-year contract to 
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) to handle the registration process.115  This reg-
istration process involved associating domain names (a human-readable 
character string such as nsf.gov) with an Internet Protocol (IP) address (used 
by computers to locate other computers).116  The Domain Name System 
(DNS) allowed users to “send and receive messages and to access infor-
mation from computers anywhere on the Internet.”117  By September 1998, 
over two million registered domain names existed.118  The Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Numbers and Names (ICANN) entered into an agreement 
 
110. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 7, at 51. 
111. Id. at 51.  By 1987, the number of computers hosted by the ARPANet had grown to 
10,000 and networks created by various organizations such as the National Science Foundation 
(NSFNet) began merging to facilitate the traffic.  Over the three years which followed, the World 
Wide Web (WWW), an international system of protocols allowing users to identify resources online 
using Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), had been developed along with most communications 
software.  Id. at 52–53. 
112. Id. at 46–47. 
113. Id. at 52. 
114. A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2003), https://
www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050 [https://perma.cc/V4D3-LX4H]. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. LENNARD G. KRUGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-868, INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES: 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES (2015). 
118. See A History of NSF and the Internet, supra note 114. 
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with the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration to oversee domain name registration, and the In-
ternet as we know it today, was born.119 
C. The 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Reclassification of the 
Internet 
By 1996, it was time for Congress to revisit the Internet’s classifica-
tion.120  The 1996 Telecommunications Act (the “1996 Act”), intending to 
“promote competition and reduce regulation,” drew a new line, this time be-
tween “information services” (including the Internet), and heavily regulated 
“telecommunications services.”121  Telecommunications services transmit 
information from one place to another “without change in the form or content 
of the information as sent and received.”122  Information Services, on the 
other hand, include “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available 
information . . . .”123  Congress found that limited regulatory interference had 
resulted in the Internet’s expansion, to the benefit of all.124  During the years 
which followed the adoption of the 1996 Act, the FCC took a “light-touch” 
approach to regulating the Internet, veering away from the large scale regu-
lation of ISPs.125  The FCC’s 1998 Stevens Report endorsed Congress’s clas-
sification of the Internet as an information service, and the Commissions 
2002 Cable Modem Order classified Internet services transmitted via cable 
systems as “interstate information service[s].”126 
 
119. Id. 
120. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996) (codifying Congress’s reclassification of the Internet as an information service). 
121. Id.; 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(24), (53) (2019). 
122. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50). 
123. Id. § 153(24). 
124. Id. § 230(a)(4). 
125. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 314 (2018). 
126. High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 4798, 
4802 (2002); Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 F.C.C. Rcd. 11501, 11536 (1998); Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000 (2005). 
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While the FCC was prepared to classify Internet services transmitted 
via cable systems as information services, the Ninth Circuit was not.127  In 
its review of the 2002 Cable Modem Order in American Telecommunications 
& Telegraph Corporation v. Portland (“Portland”), the Ninth Circuit de-
clined to recognize Internet services, when transmitted over “cable broad-
band facilities,” as information services.128  Instead, the court found that be-
cause the 1996 Act defined cable broadband transmission as a 
telecommunications service, Internet services, when transmitted over cable 
systems, should be classified the same.129  This reasoning formed the basis 
for the Ninth Circuit’s declaratory ruling on the subject two years later where 
it found that “the Commission could not permissibly construe the 1996 Act 
to exempt cable companies providing cable modem service from mandatory 
Title II regulation.”130 
In its review of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Ser-
vices (“Brand X”) disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Portland.131  
The Court held that the Ninth Circuit “erred in refusing to apply” the correct 
framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Counsel (“Chevron”) when analyzing the Commission’s classification.132  
The Chevron framework “requires a federal court to defer to an agency’s 
construction, even if it differs from what the court believes to be the best 
interpretation, if the particular statute is within the agency’s jurisdiction to 
administer, the statute is ambiguous on the point at issue, and the agency’s 
construction is reasonable.”133  Here, the Brand X Court found that because 
 
127. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the 
transmission of Internet service to subscribers over cable broadband facilities is a telecommunica-
tions service under the Communications Act.”). 
128. Id. at 878. 
129. See id. at 877–78. 
130. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 968. 
131. Id. at 996. 
132. Id. at 981–82, 984; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (summarizing the two-part Chevron framework utilized by the Supreme 
Court in this case to address the deference owed to a federal agency where the agency’s construction 
of a federal statute is at issue). 
133. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 969 (citation omitted). 
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the 1996 Act “fails unambiguously to classify non-facilities-based infor-
mation-service providers that use telecommunications inputs to provide an 
information service,” the classification of Internet services transmitted over 
cable systems fell under the FCC’s purview.134  Furthermore, given the in-
separability of the telecommunication and information-service aspects of ca-
ble broadband transmission, the Court found that the FCC’s classification of 
this communications technology as an information service was reasonable.135 
In 2004, the then-chairman of the FCC, Michael K. Powell, described 
four principles essential to maintaining the Internet’s open architecture.136  
These four principles include the freedom to access content, freedom to use 
applications, freedom to attach personal devices, and the freedom to obtain 
service plan information.137  Powell emphasized that “ensuring that consum-
ers can obtain and use the content, applications and devices they want – is 
critical to unlocking the vast potential of the broadband Internet.”138  In 2005, 
these freedoms were adopted by the FCC, and over the next two years, the 
Commission continued to expand the definition of information services set 
out in the 1996 Act to include wireless broadband Internet services and the 
transmission of Internet services over powerlines.139  By classifying these 
forms of Internet distribution as information services, the FCC ensured that 
they would be subject to the lighter regulatory schema set out by the 1996 
Act, and that local regulations to the contrary would be preempted.140  At the 
time, both Congress and the FCC believed that minimal regulation promoted 
maximum growth.141 
  
 
134. Id. at 996–97. 
135. Id. at 997. 
136. Michael K. Powell, supra note 21, at 5. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 3. 
139. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless 
Networks, 22 F.C.C. Rcd. 5901, 5909–10 (2007); United Power Line Councils Petition for Declar-
atory Ruling, 21 F.C.C. Rcd. 13281, 13285 (2006). 
140. 47 U.S.C. §§ 234(a)(4), (b)(2), 253(a), (d) (2019). 
141. Id. § 234(b)(1)–(b)(2). 
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D. Preservation of the Internet’s Open Architecture Calls for 
Increased Regulation 
In 2008, the FCC found that Comcast, an Internet services provider, 
violated two of the four Internet freedoms proffered by Powell that the Com-
mission adopted in its Internet Policy Statement, namely the freedom to ac-
cess content and the freedom to use applications.142  An investigation 
launched by the Associated Press determined that Comcast “actively inter-
fer[ed] with attempts by some of its high-speed Internet subscribers to share 
files online,” in some cases blocking sharing altogether.143  This conduct was 
specifically directed at subscribers utilizing BitTorrent, a service which had 
become a competitive threat to cable companies such as Comcast.144  Bit-
Torrent allowed users to view videos online that they would otherwise pay 
to watch on cable.145  This order served as one of the first instances in which 
the FCC attempted to regulate the behavior of ISP’s “traffic management” 
practices in the interest of equal access by users.146  The Commission ulti-
mately found that Comcast’s conduct was unreasonable, “invasive and out-
right discriminatory.”147 
Although the Supreme Court in Brand X specifically rejected that Title 
II vested the FCC with regulatory jurisdiction over ISPs, the Commission 
claimed its authority over Comcast derived from its “ancillary jurisdiction to 
regulate interstate and foreign communications” under Title I of the 1934 
 
142. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 13028, 13034, 13050–52 (2008). 
143. Id. at 13031. 
144. Id. at 13030. 
145. Id. 
146. See id. at 13045–46. 
147. Id. at 13051, 13059. 
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Act.148  Because the FCC considered the “peer-to-peer TCP connections”149 
provided by Comcast to constitute a form of communication by wire, the 
Commission found that Comcast’s conduct fell under the FCC’s jurisdic-
tion.150  The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed 
with the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction argument and vacated the FCC’s 2002 
Cable Modem Order two years later in Comcast Corporation v. Federal 
Communications Commission (“Comcast”).151  The court found that the 
Commission’s basis for ancillary jurisdiction over Comcast rested on policy 
reasons alone and thus, the FCC failed to support that exercising jurisdiction 
over Comcast was “reasonably ancillary” to the agency’s effective perfor-
mance of  “statutorily mandated responsibilities.”152 
In response to the appellate court’s decision, the FCC issued the 2010 
Open Internet Order.153  This Order relied on Section 706 of the 1996 Act 
which employed the FCC and state governments to “encourage the deploy-
ment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications ca-
pability to all Americans . . . .”154  In its Order, the Commission sought to 
protect the freedoms set-forth in the Internet Policy Statement by requiring 
ISPs to publicly disclose their management practices and prohibiting them 
 
148. Id. at 13034–36; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 976 (2005); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169–70, 172, 178 
(1968) (holding that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction extended the agency’s regulatory control over 
cable television); Christopher J. Wright, The Scope of the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction After the 
D.C. Circuit’s Net Neutrality Decisions, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 19, 24 (2015). 
149. A peer-to-peer (P2P) network allows users to share content with each other directly.  
P2P, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/p2p [https://perma.cc/K6A6-3QJR] (explain-
ing that “[i]n a P2P network, the “peers” are computer systems which are connected to each other 
via the Internet and files can be shared directly between systems on the network without the need 
of a central server.”). 
150. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 
F.C.C. Rcd. at 13035. 
151. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
152. Id. at 655 (citation omitted). 
153. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905 
(2010). 
154. 47 U.S.C. § 706 (1997).  While this section has been codified as § 1302, it is commonly 
referred to as § 706 as it appeared in the initial, uncodified version of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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from blocking lawful websites.155  Through the creation of “narrowly tai-
lored” rules, the FCC sought to preserve the open architecture of the Internet 
with the idea that this openness would encourage innovation and its contin-
ued development.156  Again, the FCC was met with opposition by the D.C. 
Circuit Court.157  In 2014, the court rejected the FCC’s blocking restrictions 
in Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission, finding the restrictions 
too closely resembled the regulations imposed on Title II telecommunication 
services and thus, were outside of the FCC’s authority when applied to in-
formation services.158  The court did, however, uphold the disclosure require-
ment.159  
Following Verizon, it became clear that the separation of information 
and telecommunication services, which once served to further the FCC’s 
goal of encouraging the Internet’s growth, was becoming a roadblock to reg-
ulations necessary for consumer protection.160  Where at one time, the growth 
of this industry was most threatened by government interference, govern-
ment action was now necessary to prevent monopolization and restriction of 
public access.161  In November 2014, then-president Barack Obama appealed 
to the FCC, stating: “I believe the FCC should reclassify consumer broad-
band service under Title II of the Telecommunications Act,” the same sec-
tion which houses the regulations imposed on the telecommunications indus-
try.162  President Obama believed reclassification would allow for “the 
strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality.”163 
 
155. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18019, ¶ 
9. 
156. Id. at 17984–85, ¶¶ 145, 148. 
157. See generally Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
158. Id. at 655–56. 
159. Id. at 659. 
160. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. at 17965, ¶ 
112. 
161. Id. 
162. Statement by the President on Net Neutrality, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/10/statement-president-net-neu-
trality [https://perma.cc/ZJX3-GWL2]. 
163. Id. 
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Soon after, the FCC responded to President Obama’s request with a 
second Open Internet Order (referred to as the “2015 Open Internet Order”) 
which reclassified “broadband Internet access service” from an information 
service to a telecommunications service.164  The FCC’s authority to reclas-
sify the Internet in this way rested on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand 
X, requiring deference to classification decisions by federal agencies where 
the statute at issue is ambiguous.165  This reclassification allowed the FCC to 
impose the blocking, throttling, and prioritization restrictions on ISPs that 
the Commission had originally proposed in the 2010 Open Internet Order.166  
Two years later, the 2015 Open Internet Order was upheld by a divided D.C. 
Circuit Court in United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission.167  Here, the Commission argued “that although broad-
band often relies on certain information services to transmit content to end 
users, these services ‘do not turn broadband Internet access service into a 
functionally integrated information service’ because ‘they fall within the tel-
ecommunications system management exception.’”168  The Commission 
pointed to DNS and caching,169 two information services thought to be es-
sential to Internet use at the time, as falling under this exception.170  The FCC 
explained that DNS and caching only helped facilitate user access to other 
services online and thus, were not so essential to Internet transmission that 
the classification of broadband Internet services as information services 
should be required.171 
 
164. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5615 (2015). 
165. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996–97 
(2005). 
166. Jacob Kastrenakes, The FCC Just Killed Net Neutrality, THE VERGE (Dec. 14, 2017, 
1:12 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/14/16776154/fcc-net-neutrality-vote-results-rules-
repealed [https://perma.cc/TED2-7TVB]. 
167. United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
168. Id. at 699 (quoting Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 
5765). 
169. See infra Section IV for a more detailed description of DNS and caching functionali-
ties. 
170. United States Telecomm. Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 699. 
171. Id. at 699–700. 
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E. The End of the Neutral Net 
On December 14, 2017, the FCC voted 3-2 along party lines to pass the 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIFO).172  This decision followed the 
November 2016 election of Republican Donald Trump who joined a repub-
lican-controlled Congress.173  In early January 2017, President Trump ap-
pointed Ajit Pai to lead the FCC, replacing former chairman and Net Neu-
trality proponent Tom Wheeler.174  Pai took immediate action to repeal the 
restrictions on ISP blocking, throttling, and prioritization behaviors set forth 
in the 2015 Open Internet Order.175  In describing the motivation behind 
RIFO, the FCC claimed the Order would create “a favorable climate for net-
work investment . . ., spurring competition and innovation that benefits con-
sumers.”176  However, the FCC failed to consider the fact that competition 
amongst ISPs is largely illusory.177 
A competitive market requires that consumers have access to three or 
more options when choosing service providers.178  “In wireless, for instance, 
the FCC and DOJ have repeatedly shot down mergers that would result in 
 
172. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 311 (2018).  This Order was later 
upheld, subject to modifications, by the D.C. Circuit Court in October, 2019.  Mozilla Corp. v. 
FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
173. Julian Boger, Democrats Fail to Retake Control of the Senate After Big Losses on 
Election Night, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov
/08/us-congress-election-results-senate-house-democrats-republicans [https://perma.cc/K3AG-
L57E]. 
174. Shawn Knight, Ajit Pai to Replace Tom Wheeler as Head of the FCC, TECHSPOT (Jan. 
24, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.techspot.com/news/67880-ajit-pai-replace-tom-wheeler-head-
fcc.html [https://perma.cc/HDF5-UKBX]. 
175. See Bio of Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/leadership/ajit-
pai#bio [https://perma.cc/U8ZP-8AAX]. 
176. Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, FCC Acts to Restore Internet Freedom (Dec. 14, 
2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-takes-action-restore-Internet-freedom [https://perma.cc
/7536-YZYD]. 
177. Sascha Segan, Exclusive: Check Out the Terrible State of US ISP Competition, PC 
MAG (Dec. 15, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/news/357972/exclusive-data-shows-
the-terrible-state-of-us-isp-competitio [https://perma.cc/P3WP-FGGX]. 
178. Id. 
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fewer than four nationwide carriers, for competitive reasons.”179  However, 
a recent study that collected Internet speeds from consumers located in 
21,511 of the United States’ 33,092 ZIP codes over five months showed that 
only 30% of those consumers had three or more ISP options.180  “A free-
market approach to internet access doesn’t work if there’s no free market.”181  
With so little competition between ISPs, it is hard to reconcile the FCC’s 
reasoning with any projected increase in competition.182  The reason behind 
the lack of competition in the ISP market is subject to debate however, one 
explanation seems particularly convincing: it is simply too expensive to cre-
ate the infrastructure necessary to provide Internet services.183  It is unclear 
how RIFO will lessen the cost of infrastructure creation or otherwise encour-
age competition in the ISP market.  It seems more likely that the ISPs cur-
rently in existence will benefit from the FCC’s Order while new companies 
will continue to be barred by the financial cost of entry into this market. 
 RIFO lifted the prohibition on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritiza-
tion by ISPs, and reversed the Internet’s classification under Title II.184  
While the 2017 Order requires that ISPs publicly disclose185 blocking, throt-
tling, and prioritization behaviors, RIFO does not actually require that these 
providers refrain from doing so.186  Thus, it appears that as long as ISPs issue 
the proper disclosures, these providers are free to offer consumers a brows-
ing experience tailored in whichever way they choose.187  By allowing ISPs 
 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 450 (2018). 
185. Disclosure Instructions for ISPs, FCC (June 13, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/con-
sumer-governmental-affairs/internet-service-provider-disclosures/disclosure-instructions-isps 
[https://perma.cc/C3Z4-UB65] (outlining the Transparency Rule, 47 CFR § 8.1(a), which requires 
Internet service providers (ISPs) to disclose information about its broadband Internet access ser-
vices in one of two ways: (1) by providing it on a publicly available, easily accessible website of 
its choosing or, (2) by submitting it to the FCC). 
186.  See id. 
187.  See id. 
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to harbor such control over the Internet experience they provide and inform 
consumers only after the fact, RIFO sets-forth a regulatory scheme that is 
inherently unbalanced and violates the very principles of competition and 
industrial growth which the Order claims to protect. 
Although its name might suggest otherwise, RIFO does not restore In-
ternet freedom.  In fact, it appears that the 2017 Order does not even preserve 
the Internet freedom which already existed.  Instead, the Order restores the 
Internet’s classification as a Title I information service; a categorization al-
ready deemed unsatisfactory by the 2015 Open Internet Order.188  The FCC’s 
long and tumultuous history of Internet regulation met with judicial opposi-
tion sought to achieve one common purpose: to encourage the Internet’s 
growth and accessibility.189  By removing restrictions on blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization, RIFO does not achieve this purpose.190  Instead, the 
2017 Order fails to take into account the rapid and expansive growth of the 
Internet services industry and the evolution of regulatory framework neces-
sary to accommodate it.191  How ISP’s financially biased tailoring of user’s 
Internet experience will affect the American people in the long-term is at 
best, speculative.  However, a future without Net Neutrality is one in which 
users will lose agency over the media they consume and their worldviews, 
as accessibility online becomes a luxury only the wealthiest companies can 
afford and the content available represents the preferences of these fortunate 
few. 
III. IMPACTS THIS REPEAL COULD HAVE ON THE ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRY 
By eliminating the safeguards which prevented ISPs from blocking, 
throttling, and engaging in paid prioritization, RIFO has the ability to detri-
mentally impact the future of the Internet.192  If ISPs choose to engage in this 
 
188. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5742, 
¶ 328 (2015). 
189. See generally Powell, supra note 21, at 1–2. 
190. See Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905, 
17985 (2010) (explaining why restrictions on this behavior are essential to the Internet’s Open 
Architecture). 
191. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 162. 
192. Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71. 
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once-prohibited conduct they will be capable of not only controlling Internet 
access by consumers, but also limiting the visibility of online companies.193  
On both sides of the payment hierarchy, those who can pay the most will 
reap the greatest benefit.194  While the entertainment industry has yet to see 
major changes caused by the removal of these restrictions, to remain idle in 
the hopes that ISPs will still take a consumer-friendly approach in the years 
to come is “wishful thinking.”195  The online streaming service industry, with 
its complete reliance on online distribution, is particularly vulnerable to ISP 
discrimination.196  A payment hierarchy will disadvantage consumers and 
small businesses alike by creating financial barriers to entry and allowing 
“the Verizons and AT&Ts of the world . . . to determine what we watch and 
what we do by charging fees based on the user, the application, the content, 
[and] the platform.”197   
A. Increasing Popularity of Online Video Streaming Services 
  With research showing that consumers want to take an active role in 
their viewing experience, choosing the content they stream and connecting 
with friends while doing so, online streaming services such as Netflix and 
Hulu offer an ideal television experience.198  Netflix, which boasts the largest 
user base of any online streaming service, reported 60.1 million United 
 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 70. 
196. James K. Wilcox, How You’ll Know Net Neutrality Is Really Gone, CONSUMER REP. 
(June 11, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/net-neutrality/end-of-net-neutrality-what-to-
watch-for/ [https://perma.cc/NFD6-3M7F]. 
197. James E. McMillan, FCC’s Worrisome Repeal of Net Neutrality Laws, L.A. LAW., 
May 2018, at 1, 36, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2018-issues/may-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5VG-3B9L]. 
198. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 395, 401–03.  Online streaming providers are also capable 
of providing consumers with a wider variety of content options which exceeds that available on 
cable.  While cable providers are subject to the FCC’s “must carry,” laws requiring that they dedi-
cate channels to broadcast local networks, online streaming providers are not restricted by such 
rules.  This allows online streaming providers to host a wide variety of content, making them an 
even more appealing option to consumers.  WINSTON MAXWELL ET AL., REGULATION IN A 
DIGITAL AGE 1, 11 (2018). 
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States subscribers in the second quarter of 2019.199  To put this in perspec-
tive, the highest number of cable subscriptions during any given year was 
reported as being nearly 69 million in the FCC’s Eighth Annual Video Com-
petition Report in 2001.200  The number of consumers subscribing to Netflix 
alone illustrates the pervasive impact that blocking, throttling, and prioriti-
zation of content by ISPs could have on this industry.  
B. The Non-Neutral Net’s Potential Consequences for Online Video 
Streaming Services 
To outline the ramifications that blocking, throttling, and paid prioriti-
zation by ISPs may have on consumers’ ability to access content online, a 
description of these once-prohibited behaviors are provided here.  Subject to 
one exception,201 blocking a website makes it impossible to access.202  Throt-
tling a website makes it more difficult to access by restricting the bandwidth 
available to your computer in processing the information necessary to dis-
play content.203  Put simply, throttling makes content difficult to load.204  Paid 
prioritization,205 on the other hand, translates to ISPs ability “to charge for 
 
199. Amy Watson, Number of Netflix Paying Streaming Subscribers Worldwide from 3rd 
Quarter 2011 to 2nd Quarter 2019 (in Millions), STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/250934/quarterly-number-of-netflix-streaming-subscribers-worldwide/ 
[https://perma.cc/CP9G-LEPA]. 
200. See generally FCC Adopts 8th Annual Report on Competition in Video Markets, FCC, 
at 1 (Jan. 14, 2002), https://transition.fcc.gov/mb/8compnr.txt [https://perma.cc/T3YC-BU6B]. 
201. See generally TJ McCue, How Does A VPN Work?, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 11:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2019/06/20/how-does-a-vpn-work/#187a973b70cd 
[https://perma.cc/5C6J-QRM5] (describing how users may circumvent blocking by use of a Virtual 
Personal Network (VPN), which enables the user to connect to the network used by a different 
server somewhere in the Internet). 
202. Keller, supra note 28. 
203. Tim Fisher, What Is Bandwidth?, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://
www.lifewire.com/what-is-bandwidth-2625809 [https://perma.cc/2V67-FJSW]. 
204. Id. 
205. Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate 
and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 652 (2008) (describing that to facilitate paid-prioritization 
and bandwidth throttling, ISPs utilize Internet routing equipment, including “packet sniffing” tech-
nology that analyzes the contents of the packets being sent using its server, which allows ISPs to 
assign priority to the information’s transmission). 
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some Internet services to be sped up, while all the rest are slowed down.”206 
It is also important to understand that throttling and prioritization work in 
tandem.207  “Because paid prioritization is a zero-sum game, speeding up 
some traffic means other traffic is, by comparison, slowed down.”208  If ISPs 
choose to enter into paid prioritization contracts with streaming services who 
can afford the fees, this could mean that those who refuse to do so could have 
their content throttled.209  This results in a “two-tiered Internet, destroying 
the web as we know it to make one preferred high-speed lane (with plenty of 
tollbooths), and a dirt road for those who can’t afford to upgrade.”210  By 
giving ISPs the selective power to pick and choose what content to prioritize, 
the FCC has handed providers the tools to censor the Internet.211 
  While ISPs, as corporations, possess First Amendment rights, they do 
not possess First Amendment obligations to consumers which would prevent 
them from limiting consumer access.212  This means that ISPs do not owe 
their consumers an objective user experience which is uninfluenced by the 
agreements they enter into.213  RIFO’s proponents argue that by eliminating 
Net Neutrality regulations, investment into and competition within the 
 
206. Katherine Trendacosta, Busting Two Myths About Pair Prioritization, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/busting-two-myths-
about-paid-prioritization [https://perma.cc/KM7S-8UJQ]. 
207. Philip Berenbroick, House Commerce Takes On Paid Prioritization, An Essential 
Tenet To The Open Internet, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (April 12, 2018), https://www.pub-
licknowledge.org/blog/house-commerce-takes-on-paid-prioritization-an-essential-tenet-to-the-
open-internet/ [https://perma.cc/2HX7-VTCR]. 
208. Id. 
209. See Schaub, supra note 20, at 70. 
210. Network Neutrality and the Fight to Save the Internet: Background, NAT’L 
COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP, https://ncac.org/resource/network-neutrality-and-the-fight-to-
save-the-Internet-background [https://perma.cc/9FRF-YDNM]. 
211. See id. 
212. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310, 342–43 (2010) (holding that the “govern-
ment may not, under the First Amendment, suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.”); Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal 
Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-compa-
nies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution [https://perma.cc/X9E3-RKAH]. 
213. Dr. Joel Timmer, Protecting and Infringing Free Speech? Net Neutrality and the First 
Amendment, 1 F.C.L.J. 1, 11–12. 
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broadband arena will increase, creating an incentive for providers to offer 
“faster, better, and cheaper” Internet services to consumers.214  It has yet to 
be seen whether this new and improved Internet will materialize as a result 
of Net Neutrality’s repeal.  However, it seems likely that with ISPs free to 
engage in practices such as tiered Internet pricing, consumers will ultimately 
find themselves paying more for the same level of service from online 
streaming services, instead of less.215  ISPs have a financial incentive to enter 
into prioritization deals with content streaming services because these deals 
allow ISPs to exchange greater content accessibility for economic gain.216  
ISPs also have a financial incentive to prioritize the content streaming ser-
vices they own, making it easier for consumers to access provider-owned 
content and directing these users away from competing services.217  These 
content providers may, in turn, displace the extra cost they pay to ISPs, in 
order to have their content prioritized, onto consumers through higher sub-
scription fees.218  Thus, while consumers may be provided with a “faster, 
cheaper and better”219 Internet, these costs may simply be displaced else-
where. 
While ISPs have pledged “not to block or throttle or otherwise discrim-
inate against legal online content such as that offered by Netflix and Hulu,” 
it is unclear what, if any, measures the FCC is taking to ensure this pledge is 
upheld.220  Notably, this pledge does not extend to cover paid prioritization, 
 
214. Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/restoring-internet-freedom 
[https://perma.cc/V234-YMEZ]. 
215. James K. Wilcox, supra note 196. 
216. See id.; see also Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71. 
217. Corynne McSherry et al., Zero Rating: What it is and Why You Should Care, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rat-
ing-what-it-is-why-you-should-care [https://perma.cc/7YPC-L47Q]. 
218. James K. Wilcox, supra note 196. 
219. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 214. 
220. John Eggerton, ISPs Renew Pledges Not to Block or Throttle, BROADCASTING AND 
CABLE (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/isps-renew-pledges-not-block-
or-throttle-170263 [https://perma.cc/VY8U-6P68]; see also Lauren C. Williams, Net Neutrality 
Could Be Undermined by Lack of Penalties for ISPs that Break the Rules, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 
19, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/net-neutrality-could-be-undermined-by-lack-of-penalties-for-
isps-that-break-the-rules-61e5e01496c8/ [https://perma.cc/LQ9M-EGQ3?type=image] (explaining 
that ambiguity in the  language of the FCC’s transparency requirement results in a situation where 
if ISPs are “caught throttling customers or blocking access, and the FCC imposes a $10 million 
YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/20  12:27 PM 
2020] CALIFORNIA, ARE YOU THERE? 277 
meaning ISPs have not promised to abstain from charging online businesses 
higher fees in exchange for increased accessibility by consumers.221  RIFO 
requires only that ISPs who have engaged in blocking, throttling, or paid 
prioritization disclose this information to their consumers “by providing it 
on a publicly available, easily accessible website of [their] choosing or,” al-
ternatively, “by submitting it to the FCC.”222  As of RIFO’s passing, power 
to take action against ISPs “for anticompetitive acts or unfair and deceptive 
practices” has been handed over to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).223  
However, the responsibility of monitoring ISPs to ensure they are adequately 
disclosing blocking, throttling, and prioritization behaviors appears to rest 
largely on consumers, with the FCC encouraging users “to file informal com-
plaints for apparent violations of the transparency rule in order to assist the 
Commission in monitoring the broadband market.”224 
A pay-to-play hierarchy, where content streaming services are required 
to pay in order to reach consumers, could mean that the structure of the 
online streaming service industry begins to model that of the cable industry 
where, “if you want to start a new channel and get significant placement, you 
better have a lot of money.”225  This structure, which streaming services have 
rebelled against, creates a financial barrier to entry.226  Smaller streaming 
services who lack the financial resources of industry giants will be unable to 
out-pay these larger companies in prioritization agreements with ISPs and 
thus, will be less accessible by consumers.227  As start-ups and smaller 
streaming services are pushed aside by larger companies, the content most 
 
fine, the company can argue that it wasn’t given adequate notice and duck the fine, or any other 
that’s above $25,000.”). 
221. Eggerton, supra note 220. 
222. Disclosure Instructions for ISPs, FCC, (June 13, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/disclo-
sure-instructions-isps [https://perma.cc/B7YX-SQ33]. 
223. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 214. 
224. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 490 (2018). 
225. Ted Johnson, What the Repeal of Net Neutrality Will Mean for Hollywood, VARIETY 
(Nov. 22, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/net-neutrality-repeal-hollywood-sig-
nificance-1202621436/ [https://perma.cc/X32H-PKH7]. 
226. See id. 
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easily accessible online will be that provided by the wealthiest companies.228  
With less streaming services able to afford the high cost of entry, innovation 
in this industry will be stifled.229  The Writers Guild of America, one of Hol-
lywood’s talent guilds, stated in response to these concerns that “without the 
rules, ISPs will be free to decide what content is available to Americans and 
on what terms, striking a blow to consumers and content creators alike.”230  
C. The Risk of ISP Monopolies in the Online Video Streaming 
Industry 
Another concern is that the FCC will no longer be effective in policing 
the Internet to ensure ISPs are not monopolizing the video streaming indus-
try.231  “The FCC . . . will lose oversight over interconnection,” which occurs 
when distinctive ISPs agree to share their respective Internet traffic across 
networks.232  Interconnection acts as the “lifeblood of the Internet,” and the 
agreement’s ISPs enter into in connection with this practice are highly con-
sequential on consumer access.233 
Online streaming services have fought interconnection before.234  In 
2014, Netflix opposed the merger of companies Comcast Corporation 
(“Comcast”) and Time Warner Cable, Inc., (“Warner”) the parent company 
of HBO, Turner, and other major video streaming services.235  In its petition 
 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Johnson, supra note 225. 
231. Id. 
232. Id.; see generally ISP Interconnection and Its Impact on Consumer Internet Perfor-
mance, MEASUREMENT LAB (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.measurementlab.net/publications/isp-
interconnection-impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUF7-AFNB]. 
233. Id. 
234. See, e.g., Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc., Applications of Comcast Corp. and Time 
Warner Cable Inc. for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Applications, No. 14-
57 (2014) (outlining Netflix’s opposition to the merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable, Inc. 
out of concern that the merger would incentivize Comcast to make Netflix and other online stream-
ing services not owned by Turner less accessible by consumers through the charging of fees at 
interconnection points). 
235. Id. at 1; WarnerMedia, AT&T, https://about.att.com/pages/company_profile_warner-
media [https://perma.cc/THA4-Z5NV]. 
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to deny the merger, Netflix argued that “[t]he combined entity would have 
the incentive and ability—through access fees charged at interconnection 
points and by other means—to harm Internet companies,” such as online 
streaming services.236  ISPs like Comcast, which offer traditional cable tele-
vision services in addition to Internet services, face competition from com-
panies like Netflix, which offer online streaming services, thus ISPs are in-
centivized to restrict consumer access to these sites.237  In its petition, Netflix 
pointed out that “[w]hile Comcast has adopted network neutrality rules for 
broadband access services,” it had created a “bandwidth crisis at intercon-
nection points,” making it more difficult for consumers to access content on 
Netflix.238  In April of 2015, Comcast called off the merger “two days after 
meetings between Comcast and federal regulators, who had signaled that 
they were leaning toward blocking [it].”239 
Three years later, in June of 2018, AT&T, the second largest provider 
of Internet services in the United States, acquired Comcast and Time Warner 
for 85 billion dollars.240  While the United States Government challenged the 
merger in the D.C. District Court, arguing that the merger would cause “harm 
to competition,” the court ultimately held that the government had “failed to 
carry its burden.”241  This merger raised antitrust questions.242  While AT&T 
and Warner did not offer the same services at the time of the merger, mean-
ing they were not direct competitors, the Department of Justice (DOJ) voiced 
concerns that AT&T would “use its ownership of Time Warner’s ‘must-
 
236. Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc., supra note 234, at i. 
237. Id. at 28. 
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warner-cable-deal.html [https://perma.cc/8KB5-PAXR]. 
240. Daniel Hemli & Jackie Java, What the AT&T/Time Warner Decision Means for Anti-
trust Enforcement, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-the-at-t-
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241. United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 17-2511, 2018 WL 3752091, at *68, *74 (D.D.C. 
June 12, 2018). 
242. Id. at *40. 
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have’ popular content to increase its bargaining leverage . . . .”243  The DOJ 
feared that this bargaining leverage would allow AT&T to demand higher 
fees from competing services, which would ultimately be passed on to con-
sumers.244  The DOJ also perceived this merger as threatening to innovation, 
arguing that the new entity would have the “incentive and ability to impede 
the growth of online video distribution services” because it would own both 
the content and the means of its distribution.245 
Some of the DOJ’s concerns previously materialized with practices like 
“zero-rating.”246  Zero-rating is where “ISPs like Verizon and AT&T offer 
. . . consumers the ability to view some video on . . . [their] wireless plan 
without it counting against their data caps, while other types of content still 
do.”247  Often times, the video content subject to zero-rating is that owned 
by the ISP.248  This behavior was criticized by both the Obama administration 
and the FCC as giving ISP-owned services an unfair competitive ad-
vantage.249  However, under the FCC’s new leadership, the Commission has 
abandoned its zero-rating investigation, with Ajit Pai arguing that zero-rating 
benefits consumers by making it cheaper to access content online.250  While 
practices like zero-rating could make it cheaper for consumers to access 
some content, those who want to access video streaming services that are not 
partnered with their ISP could end up paying a much higher cost.251  The 
anti-competitive and anti-innovative effects of practices like zero-rating, 
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which already take place, present a more imminent threat to consumers than 
many of the long-term effects of a non-neutral net described.252 
Zero-rating ultimately pushes consumers towards those services which 
offer the best rates, instead of the best content.  The streaming services who 
benefit from zero-rating, and other forms of prioritization, are given an unfair 
advantage, with consumers funneled towards their content services at the ex-
pense of alternatives.253  By allowing ISPs to engage in blocking, throttling, 
and prioritization, RIFO has turned “service providers into gatekeepers,”254 
destroying the open architecture of the internet which, at one time, seemingly 
allowed anyone anywhere to create and host content online.  Zero-rating and 
similar practices, when utilized by ISPs, will ultimately limit the diversity of 
content streaming services available, with those who are not partnered with 
providers or which lack financial resources, unable to thrive in this ISP-
controlled market.255  The long-term consequences of practices like zero-rat-
ing are capable of fundamentally changing the entertainment industry by 
awarding viewership on the basis of capital instead of artistic merit.  Con-
sumers may be pushed towards those services which offer the best rates in-
stead of the best content.  
D. China’s Great Firewall Serves as an Example of Internet 
Censorship’s Impact on Innovation 
The detrimental effects of blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization 
on innovation are poignantly demonstrated by a comparison of these behav-
iors with China’s censorship policies.256  “For as long as there’s been an In-
ternet, China has sought to monitor and control how its citizens use it.”257  
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China’s efforts are focused predominantly on minimizing public access to 
controversial government information through the monitoring of content 
hosted online.258  This content is passed through the country’s censorship 
framework, known as China’s “Great Firewall,” which blocks or restricts 
access to “web sites on an array of sensitive topics . . . .”259  With companies 
held accountable for content they host online, even that which is user-gener-
ated, there are few options to circumvent this pervasive form of censor-
ship.260 
With a population north of 1.4 billion people,261 China houses over 800 
million Internet users.262  Given the difficulty (or impossibility) of accessing 
certain webpages, these users gravitate towards government-favored web-
sites, such as the Chinese-equivalents of Facebook and Google.263  “For those 
who stick to domestic and approved Chinese sites, the browsing experience 
is speedy and seamless.”264  For those who do not, their browsing experience 
may feature prohibitively long loading times or websites that fail to load at 
all.265  Given the effects of China’s censorship framework, companies tar-
geting the massive Chinese user-base have little to no incentive to create 
content that risks being censored.266  Facebook, for example, which has his-
torically been censored by China, is seeking to develop censorship tools that 
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259. Id. 
260. Clark, supra note 256. 
261. Live Update of China’s Population, WORLDOMETERS (May 27, 2019), https://
www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/ [https://perma.cc/RRW6-PZNV]. 
262. Niall McCarthy, China Now Boasts More than 800 Million Internet Users and 98% 
of Them Are Mobile, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccar-
thy/2018/08/23/china-now-boasts-more-than-800-million-internet-users-and-98-of-them-are-mo-
bile-infographic/#3ac5fb567092 [https://perma.cc/W5CA-LD4J]. 
263. See Nick Frisch, What If You Couldn’t See This Page?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/opinion/net-neutrality-china-internet.html [https://perma.cc
/4F9L-2P7H]. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. See id. 
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will allow its platform entry into the Chinese market.267  Companies like Fa-
cebook are not obligated to provide consumers with an uncensored user ex-
perience and have little incentive to ignore markets like China in hopes that 
their censorship policies will improve.268  Access to the massive Chinese 
user-base is financially lucrative and companies who stand to profit may not 
shy away from self-censorship if it facilitates their entry.269 
China’s censorship policy has a detrimental effect on its film industry, 
where “government censorship has blocked potential hits and compelled 
filmmakers to stick with safe formulas that aren’t winning audiences.”270  In 
2019, China’s box-office totals were reported as declining for the first time 
in at least ten years.271  China’s censorship policy not only limits what type 
of content may be produced, but also what inspiration creators are able to 
access online.272  One article reports that “[w]ith the firewall blocking sites 
for obscure reasons, entrepreneurs on the mainland may struggle to innovate, 
as blocks on the web make them oblivious to many of the world’s latest 
trends and practices.”273 
Looking back at Net Neutrality’s repeal in the United States, distinc-
tions can be made between the implications of RIFO and the effects of 
China’s “Great Firewall.”274  One distinction concerns where control over 
 
267. Id. 
268. E.g., id. (“As private businesses, they are not bound by the First Amendment. Self-
censorship is simply good business.”). 
269. See id. 
270. Sheryl Tian Tong Lee & Jinshan Hong, China is Stifling its Own Movie Business, 
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-10
/china-s-movie-business-is-taking-a-hit-from-its-own-government [https://perma.cc/PV8B-589J]. 
271. Id. 
272. Beibei Bao, How Internet Censorship is Curbing Innovation in China, THE ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-Internet-censorship-is-
curbing-innovation-in-china/275188/ [https://perma.cc/R42F-VQH6]. 
273. China’s Internet Censorship Should be Lifted for the Sake of the Economy and Inno-
vators, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 15, 2018, 9:32 AM), https://www.scmp.com/comment
/letters/article/2141626/chinas-internet-censorship-should-be-lifted-sake-economy-and [https://
perma.cc/68B3-BRER]. 
274. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 263 (comparing the future of Internet in the United States 
to censored Internet in China). 
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the Internet resides.275  In China, the government controls the provision of 
Internet services, while in the United States, this control rests with ISPs.276  
Whether one is more dangerous for consumers is subject to debate, however, 
the opportunity for corruption in both is undeniable.  As described in Part II, 
consumers throughout the United States possess limited options when choos-
ing an ISP, with only 30% of consumers given a choice between three or 
more providers.277  Thus, the Chinese government’s centralized control over 
the Internet is not so different from the concentrated control of major ISPs 
over the provision of Internet services in the United States.278 
The motivation underlying the creation of a tailored user experience in 
China is blatantly political.  However, there is nothing suggesting that the 
underlying political motivations of those granted preferential treatment by 
ISPs in America will not, in the long-term, result in a comparable bias in the 
availability of online resources.  The consequences of zero-rating appear to 
illustrate yet another similarity between China’s censorship practices and the 
non-neutral net in the United States.  Using censorship to block access to 
websites such as Facebook or Google, China has driven consumers to access 
Chinese-owned equivalent services.279  Similarly, in the United States, prac-
tices like zero-rating motivate consumers through the offering of lower sub-
scription fees or increased accessibility, to access certain preferred services 
at the expense of alternatives.280  Much like censorship has stifled Chinese 
innovation, ISPs, by blocking, throttling, and prioritizing content, have the 
 
275. Id. 
276. Id. (explaining that “[c]ontent providers — companies like Facebook and LinkedIn — 
are not, after all, common carriers . . . [and] do not control the pipes, or carry a unique public trust 
in the eyes of the government,” unlike “American telecom companies — those that do control the 
pipes.”). 
277. Segan, supra note 177 (outlining at study conducted by PC Mag which “looked at test 
data from more than 20,000 ZIP codes across the country.”). 
278. See id.; see also Lee & Hong, supra note 270. 
279. Frisch, supra note 263; see also Paige Leskin, Here are all the Major US tech Com-
panies Blocked Behind China’s ‘Great Firewall’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:23 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/major-us-tech-companies-blocked-from-operating-in-china-
2019-5 [https://perma.cc/Z8S2-GFAP]. 
280. See McSherry et al., supra note 217. 
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power to skew users towards accessing services that are ISP-owned or finan-
cially capable of paying for prioritization.281  ISPs are private corporations 
which have an incentive to profit.282  As a result, consumer access to content 
online may be tailored to meet the expectations of relationships into which 
ISPs have entered, much like consumer access in China is tailored to the 
Chinese Government’s political regime.  China’s censorship policy illus-
trates the detrimental impact that restrictions on consumer access to content 
online can have on innovation and consumers alike.283 
IV. SOLVING THE NON-NEUTRAL NIGHTMARE 
With the FCC having turned its back on Net Neutrality, it is up to state 
and local governments, as well as online businesses, to preserve the Inter-
net’s open architecture.  As set-forth above, the effects of RIFO on the video 
streaming service industry could be detrimental, harming innovation, com-
petition, and consumers alike by creating financial barriers to entry.  Thus, 
the time for intervention is now. 
First, this Section will summarize the unsuccessful efforts of states and 
private organizations to reverse RIFO in Mozilla Corporation v. Federal 
Communications Commission284 (“Mozilla”), a case that was decided by the 
D.C. Circuit Court in October, 2019.  Second, California’s ability to enact 
its own, state-specific Net Neutrality legislation will be addressed in light of 
the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision to vacate the FCC’s preemption powers 
under RIFO.  An analysis of the federal mechanisms which remain as threats 
to California’s legislative authority over the regulation of Internet services 
will accompany this discussion.  Furthermore, the Federal Government’s 
case against California, to preempt its state-specific Net Neutrality law, will 
be described as an important opportunity for clarification of the Mozilla de-
cision.  Third, municipal provision of broadband Internet services will be 
described as a promising alternative to the legislative route.  Finally, the im-
plementation of city-wide broadband monitoring will be presented as a 
method of holding ISPs accountable, regardless of the current state of RIFO 
or legislation in this area. 
 
281. See id. 
282. See Segan, supra note 177. 
283. Bao, supra note 272; Lee & Hong, supra note 270. 
284. 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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A. Mozilla v. FCC: How States and Private Organizations 
Attempted to Overturn RIFO 
On October 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit Court decided the Mozilla case,285 
issuing an opinion that seemingly nailed another stud into Net Neutrality’s 
coffin.  This decision put an end to the lawsuit that states and private organ-
izations had initiated against the FCC in response to RIFO over a year and a 
half prior.286  Petitioners, led by Mozilla Corporation, argued that the FCC’s 
decision was “arbitrary and capricious”287  and “that the FCC’s order unlaw-
fully purport[ed] to preempt state and local regulation of broadband ser-
vice.”288  The D.C. Circuit Court majority found in favor of the FCC, up-
holding RIFO and deeming the FCC’s reclassification of the Internet under 
Title I valid.289  Despite RIFO’s validity, the majority vacated the portion of 
the Order that outlined the FCC’s broad authority to preempt state regulation 
of Internet services.290  The majority’s decision invited debate by the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions.  Judge Millett, concurring in the judgment, 
pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, relied on by the 
majority, has become outdated as a result of the technological advancements 
that have been made in the Internet services industry.291  The lone dissenter, 
Judge Williams, envisioned an entirely different outcome with respect to the 
majority’s decision to vacate RIFO’s preemption directive based on, what he 
 
285. Id. at 1. 
286. See E-mail from Markham C. Erickson, Couns., Mozilla Corporation, to Thomas M. 
Johnson, Gen. Couns., Federal Communications Commission (Feb. 22, 2018), https://
blog.mozilla.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Mozilla-Petition-for-Review-WC-Docket-No.-17-
108-Letter-to-FCC-22Feb2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGA7-M6F2]; see Protective Petition For 
Review, New York, et al. v. FCC, No. 18-1013 (D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2018). 
287. Proof Brief for Government Petitioners at 15, Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, No. 18-1051(L) 
(D.C. Aug, 20, 2018). 
288. New York v. FCC, No. 18-1013 (D.C. filed Jan. 16th, 2018) (listing the states included 
in the lawsuit as being California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and the District of Columbia). 
289. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18, 35. 
290. Id. at 18, 74. 
291. Id. at 87 (Millet, J., concurring). 
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believes, is the proper interpretation of existing precedent derived from the 
United States Supreme Court.292 
In addressing RIFO’s validity, the D.C. Circuit, “approach[ed] the is-
sue through the lens of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X.293  In Brand 
X, the Supreme Court applied the analytical framework it had established in 
Chevron as applicable to issues involving the authority of federal agencies.294  
Because Brand X relied heavily on the framework delineated in Chevron, it 
is appropriate to offer a description of the Chevron decision here. Chevron 
involved a dispute between the states and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) over the meaning of the term, “stationary source,” as used in 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (the “Amendments”).295  The Su-
preme Court ultimately found the EPA’s interpretation of stationary sources 
as encompassing whole industrial plants reasonable, applying a two-prong 
analysis that has become known as the Chevron framework.296  The first 
Chevron factor asks “whether Congress has directly spoken on the question 
at issue.”297  If the intent of Congress is clear, the court has adequate guid-
ance to interpret the statute and does not owe deference to the agency’s in-
terpretation.298  If Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, but has in-
stead been ambiguous or silent, leaving “a gap for the agency to fill,” the 
agency possesses regulatory authority.299  Where the agency possesses regu-
latory authority, the reviewing court must exercise deference in answering 
the second question in Chevron: Whether the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute is reasonable.300  The deferential standard of the Chevron framework 
favors decisions made by federal agencies, giving them “controlling weight 
 
292. Id. at 96–97 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
293. Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
294. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 969 
(2005); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
295. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 842. 
298. Id. at 842–43. 
299. Id. at 843–44. 
300. Id. 
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unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”301  
Where an agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law,” the Administrative Procedure Act 
requires that it be set aside by the court.302 
In Brand X, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether 
the FCC had properly classified broadband cable modem services as infor-
mation services under Title I of the 1996 Act.303  This issue of classification 
revolved around the FCC’s interpretation of  “telecommunications services” 
and “information services” as defined in the Act.304  In applying the first 
prong of the Chevron analysis, the Supreme Court found that Section 151 of 
the 1996 Act, which employs the FCC to “prescribe such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary . . . to carry out the [1996 Act’s] provisions,” evi-
denced Congress’s intent that the interpretation of this Act fall under the 
FCC’s jurisdiction.305  Moving on to the second Chevron factor, the Supreme 
Court found that the FCC’s interpretation of “information services,” as in-
cluding cable modem services was permissible under the 1996 Act.306  The 
Commission reasoned that, “because [cable modem service] provides con-
sumers with a comprehensive capability for manipulating information using 
the Internet,” it fell within the 1996 Act’s definition of information ser-
vices.307  In making this argument, the FCC pointed specifically to Domain 
Name Services (DNS) and caching, two functionalities it deemed insepara-
ble to the Internet’s transmission and use, which require the manipulation 
component necessary to satisfy this definition.308  In other words, the FCC 
argued that because a couple of processes tied to the provision of Internet 
services could be classified as information services, Internet services as a 
whole should be too.  
 
301. Id. 
302. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2020). 
303. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 980. 
306. Id. at 971. 
307. Id. at 987. 
308. Id. at 999. 
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Ten years after the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Brand X, the FCC 
issued the 2015 Open Internet Order, reclassifying Internet services as tele-
communications services under Title II of the Communications Act.309  The 
FCC then reclassified Internet services again seven years later with RIFO, 
this time as information services back under Title I.310  Thus, when Mozilla 
was brought in front of the D.C. Circuit Court, the Internet’s classification 
had come full circle.  The court was asked to answer the same question it had 
answered in Brand X: whether the FCC’s classification of Internet services 
under Title I of the Communications Act was valid.311  Addressing the first 
Chevron factor, the D.C. Circuit Court followed the binding precedent set-
forth by Brand X, finding that the 1996 Act had left issues of classification 
to the Commission’s discretion.312  Turning to the second Chevron Factor, 
the D.C. Circuit Court was equally bound by Brand X.313  Once again, DNS 
and caching were found to be indispensable to the online user experience and 
so “inextricably intertwined” with Internet services as to render the Internet’s 
classification as an information service reasonable.314  
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X bound the Circuit 
Court’s opinion in Mozilla,315 the relevance of Brand X’s application fifteen 
years after it was decided is questionable.  In her concurrence, Judge Millett 
describes how the technological landscape has shifted since Brand X.316  She 
argues that the major role that “auxiliary services like DNS and caching” 
once played in Internet access has decreased substantially over the last fif-
teen years.317  DNS, which at the time of Brand X was available only as part 
 
309. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601 (2015) 
(reclassifying the Internet as a telecommunications service under Title II). 
310. See generally Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311 (2018) (reclassifying 
the Internet as an information service under Title I). 
311. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 18–19 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
312. Id. at 19–20. 
313. Id. at 20. 
314. Id. at 21. 
315. Id. at 89 (Millett, J., concurring). 
316. Id. at 90–91. 
317. Id. 
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of the Internet services provisioned by ISPs, is now available through a va-
riety of online providers.318  Similarly, the prevalence of caching, which does 
not work when a website is encrypted, has dramatically decreased as en-
crypted user traffic reached 50% in 2017.319  By relying on these functional-
ities to support its classification of the Internet as an information service, 
Judge Millett concludes that “the Commission misses the technological for-
est for a twig.”320  This point is of particular importance, with Judge Millet 
emphasizing that Brand X has become “unhinged from the realities of mod-
ern broadband service” and as a result, modern Internet regulation risks be-
coming “trapped . . . . in technological anachronism.”321 
It is clear that the Internet today is dramatically different that the Inter-
net as it is existed “during the bygone era of iPods, AOL, and Razr flip 
phones,” when Brand X was decided.322  If the Mozilla decision is appealed 
to the Supreme Court, Brand X may finally be retired and replaced with prec-
edent that is more relevant to the current technological landscape and favor-
able to Net Neutrality. 323  Alternatively, Congress could enact legislation 
that speaks directly to the Internet’s classification and thus, replace Brand X 
as the guiding precedent in this area.324  This option, however, seems much 
less likely to favor Net Neutrality.  The Net Neutrality debate has become a 
political issue, with conservatives largely in favor of repealing these regula-
tions.325  Under the current administration, in which both the executive 
branch and Senate are Republican-controlled,326 federal legislation in this 
area is likely to mirror RIFO, removing Net Neutrality protections. 
 
318. Id. at 90. 
319. Id. at 91. 
320. Id. at 94. 
321. Id. at 89. 
322. Id. at 87. 
323. Id. at 89. 
324. Id. 
325. Kate Patrick, How Political Messaging Drives the Net Neutrality Debate, INSIDE 
SOURCES (April 10, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/how-political-messaging-drives-the-
net-neutrality-debate/ [https://perma.cc/UC4S-54ZN]. 
326. Id. 
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As of the Mozilla decision, RIFO is in full effect and ISPs continue to 
enjoy the freedom to block, throttle, and prioritize content online that they 
did as of the Order’s passing in 2018.327  However, the fight for Net Neutral-
ity may not be over.  By vacating the portion of RIFO which outlined the 
FCC’s broad preemption authority under this Order, it appears that the D.C. 
Circuit has opened the door to state regulation of Internet services.328  How-
ever, until the Mozilla decision is applied to a case involving a state law 
which conflicts with RIFO, the intricacies of the D.C. Circuit Court’s opin-
ion when applied to a real-world scenario are unknown.  While the Mozilla 
decision is clear as to the FCC’s lacking authority to preempt state regula-
tions which conflict with RIFO,329 this does not mean that state regulation in 
this area is immune to other federal obstacles such as conflict preemption or 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  As described by Williams in Mozilla, “[t]he 
consequences of the Commission’s choice of Title I depend on its having 
authority to preempt.”330  How RIFO will be enforced, in light of the FCC’s 
lacking authority to preempt, is unclear. 
B. California Aims to Restore Net Neutrality with Senate Bill 822 
On September 30, 2018, eight months after Net Neutrality’s repeal, 
California Governor Jerry Brown approved Senate Bill 822, which would 
replace many of the safeguards abandoned by the FCC.331  This new state 
law would, “[prohibit] . . . ISPs, from blocking or slowing access to legal 
online content, demanding special fees from websites to prioritize their traf-
fic or charging customers for special exemptions to caps on their data.”332  
While the Bill promised a restoration of Net Neutrality to Californians, it 
 
327. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18 (majority opinion). 
328. Id. at 86. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 97 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
331. California Internet Consumer Protection and Neutrality Act of 2018, S. 822, 2018 
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
332. Alex Johnson, California Enacts Net Neutrality Bill, DOJ Counters With Lawsuit, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018, 1:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/Internet/gov-jerry-brown-
signs-bill-restore-net-neutrality-california-n915221 [https://perma.cc/LF7G-2E43]. 
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never got the opportunity to do so.333  The same day Governor Jerry Brown 
signed Senate Bill 822, the Federal Government announced its plan to sue 
California for attempting to interfere with federal legislation.334  The govern-
ment’s case against California, United States v. California, was then filed in 
the Eastern District of California.335  In support of Senate Bill 822’s preemp-
tion, the DOJ argued that the Bill “unlawfully imposes burdens on the Fed-
eral Government’s deregulatory approach to the Internet,” making enforce-
ment of RIFO by the FCC nearly impossible.336  Ultimately, California and 
the DOJ agreed to stay United States v. California until the D.C. Circuit 
Court rendered its decision in Mozilla.337  Now that the D.C. Circuit has done 
so, this case is more important than ever.  While the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
opinion vacates the FCC’s Preemption Directive under RIFO,338 it is unclear 
whether other bars may exist to state regulation of Internet services.  United 
States v. California could be the first decision to illustrate the application of 
Mozilla to a conflicting state law.  Furthermore, if the court in United States 
v. California ultimately upholds California’s Bill, this could represent a mas-
sive step towards achieving Net Neutrality nationwide.339   
 
333. Id. 
334. Klint Finley, California Will Pause Net Neutrality Law for Federal Suit, WIRED (Oct. 
26, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-will-pause-net-neutrality-law-for-
federal-suit/ [https://perma.cc/UX7G-RKU5]. 
335. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2018). 
336. Justice Department Files Net Neutrality Lawsuit Against the State of Califor-
nia, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-net-
neutrality-lawsuit-against-state-california-0 [https://perma.cc/9K9A-W2V4]. 
 
337. Stipulation Regarding Temporary Stay Of Litigation And Agreement Not To Enforce 
Senate Bill 822, United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018). 
338. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 86 (majority opinion). 
339. QuickFacts California, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA [https://perma.cc/XVM6-LETL] (listing California’s population, 
as of July 1, 2019, as 39,512,223); Hans Johnson, California’s Population, PUBLIC POLICY 
INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA (Mar. 2017), https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-population/ 
[https://perma.cc/L27Q-R6NJ] (describing California as “the most populous state in the nation.”); 
Makena Kelly, California’s Net Neutrality Bill Could Set a National Standard, THE VERGE (June 
4, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/4/17414384/california-net-neutrality-bill-washington-
epa [https://perma.cc/YEY2-LTRU] (describing California’s history of “single-handedly forcing 
national legislation . . . .”). 
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1. The D.C. Circuit Court Rejects the FCC’s Preemption Directive 
Denying the FCC’s power to preempt under RIFO, the Mozilla major-
ity found that the Commission had made a “fatal” mistake when it “ignored 
binding precedent by failing to ground its sweeping Preemption Di-
rective . . . in a lawful source of statutory authority.”340  Judge Williams dis-
agreed with this finding in the dissenting portion of his opinion.341  Here, 
Williams argued that the FCC, while lacking express authority to preempt, 
possessed implied authority stemming from the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Brand X, Chevron, and other applicable case precedent.342 
The D.C. Circuit Court previously set-out the limited circumstances in 
which the FCC possesses authority to preempt state law in Public Service 
Commission of Maryland v. Federal Communications Commission (“Mary-
land”).343  In this case, the court held that, “FCC preemption of state regula-
tion is . . . permissible when (1) the matter to be regulated has both interstate 
and intrastate aspects . . . ; (2) FCC preemption is necessary to protect a valid 
federal regulatory objective . . . ; and (3) state regulation would ‘negate[] the 
exercise by the FCC of its own lawful authority.’”344  The final factor is met 
where the interstate and intrastate aspects of the service are so intertwined 
that state regulation would interfere with the FCC’s authority to do the 
same.345  The court’s decision in Maryland clarified that “the FCC cannot 
regulate (let alone preempt state regulation of) any service that does not fall 
within its Title II jurisdiction over common carrier services or its Title I ju-
risdiction over matters ‘incidental’ to communication by wire.”346  This same 
principle was instructed by the Supreme Court two years prior in City of New 
York v. FCC, where the court lamented that, “an agency literally has no 
 
340. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 74. 
341. Id. at 102–04 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
342. Id. at 104. 
343. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. v. F.C.C., 909 F.2d 1510, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
344. Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 429 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
345. Id. 
346. Id. at 1514 n.4. 
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power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign 
State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”347 
When a service is classified under Title II of the 1934 Act, the FCC 
possesses “express and expansive authority” to regulate it.348  Thus, by de-
fault, the majority found that when the FCC reclassified Internet services 
under Title I, the Commission lost its express authority to preempt state ac-
tion under Title II.349  However, as identified by the court in Maryland, the 
FCC may still possess the power to preempt where the subject in question is, 
“incidental to [the] transmission [of communication by wire].”350  This au-
thority, known as ancillary jurisdiction, is available to the FCC when: “(1) 
the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I of the Commu-
nications Act covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reason-
ably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily 
mandated responsibilities.’”351  As dictated by the D.C. Circuit Court’s deci-
sion in Comcast, the “mandated responsibilities” referenced must be set-
forth in “Title II, III or VI of the Act.”352  Given that RIFO reclassified the 
Internet under Title I, the standard for ancillary jurisdiction was not met, and 
the majority found that the FCC failed to establish authority to preempt on 
this basis as well.353 
As was upheld by the Supreme Court in Brand X, the FCC possesses 
the requisite authority under the Communications Act to interpret its various 
titles and classify services within them.354  This is evidenced by the FCC’s 
classification of Internet services under Title II of the 1996 Act in its 2015 
 
347. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 80 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
348. Id. at 76 (citations omitted). 
349. Id. at 75–76. 
350. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 909 F.2d at 1514 (citations omitted). 
351. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 76 (citations omitted). 
352. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
353. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 75–76. 
354. Id. at 84. 
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Open Internet Order and the Commission’s reclassification of Internet ser-
vices under Title I of this act with RIFO.355  Which title the FCC ultimately 
chooses to classify a service under will determine the Commissions ability 
to regulate it, with Title II services subject to substantially greater federal 
regulation than Title I services.356  Ultimately, the Mozilla court found that 
by classifying Internet services under Title I of the 1996 Act but subse-
quently seeking to regulate the Internet as a Title II service, “the Commission 
overlook[ed] the Communications Act’s vision of dual federal-state author-
ity and cooperation in this area specifically.”357  If the FCC wanted to in-
crease its regulatory authority over Internet services it could, as it has done 
before, by reclassifying these services under Title II.358  However, the current 
political climate makes this alternative seem highly unlikely.  The head of 
the FCC, Ajit Pai, who was appointed by President Donald Trump, has ac-
tively fought against the Internet’s classification under Title II.359 
Instead, the FCC must ground its authority to preempt in the Internet’s 
classification as it stands today, under Title I.  Citing to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brand X, Williams argued in his dissenting opinion that the 
FCC’s authority to interpret and classify services under Title I implied that 
the Commission was authorized to preempt state regulation of Title I ser-
vices.360  Williams also pointed to the inseparability of the interstate and in-
trastate components of Internet services as requiring that the FCC possess 
power to preempt under the impossibility exception.361  This exception, “al-
lows the FCC to preempt state regulation of a service if (1) it is not possible 
to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects of the service, and (2) federal 
regulation is necessary to further a valid federal regulatory objective.”362 
 
355. See Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5601 (2015); see 
also Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 311 (2018). 
356. See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2019); see also § 151. 
357. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 81. 
358. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5601. 
359. Knight, supra note 174. 
360. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 98–99 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
361. Id. at 96. 
362. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm’n. v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 578 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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The majority disagreed with William’s finding that the FCC possessed 
implied authority to preempt.  First, the majority noted that this argument 
fails by default, as it was not advanced by the FCC as a justification for the 
Commission’s authority to preempt and instead, was William’s own “in-
vent[ion].”363  Next, the majority explained that, even if this argument were 
at issue, Williams failed to show how the FCC’s implied authority to preempt 
would act as a substitute for the Commission’s lacking jurisdiction under the 
Communications Act.364  “[T]he Commission’s power to choose one regula-
tory destination or another does not carry with it the option to mix and match 
its favorite parts of both.”365  This means that the FCC, by choosing to clas-
sify Internet services under Title I, cannot now use its regulatory authority 
under Title II as a basis for preemption. 
With Mozilla vacating a portion of the FCC’s Order, proponents may 
consider this as a silver lining, welcoming states to pass their own legislation 
concerning net neutrality. At the same time, the Mozilla decision muddies 
the waters. Specifically, Mozilla does not appear to definitively answer 
whether conflicting state laws will avoid federal preemption altogether, or 
only preemption by the FCC under the Preemption Directive.  Furthermore, 
conflict preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause, as discussed below, 
remain as federal roadblocks to state-specific legislation.  This makes the 
federal government’s case against California that much more important.  
United States v. California could serve as the first application of the Mozilla 
decision, showcasing how state laws will navigate the legislative arena now 
that RIFO’s preemption directive has been vacated. 
2. Federal Preemption May Still Present a Barrier to State Success 
While the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the FCC’s broad authority to 
preempt state regulation of the Internet under RIFO, the Court’s opinion ap-
pears to leave the door open to other forms of federal preemption as possible 
alternatives to estop state laws.366  The Federal Government’s power to 
preempt state law which interfere with its own is derived from the Suprem-
acy Clause of the United States Constitution which, in Article IV, states: 
 
363. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 82 (majority opinion). 
364. Id. at 82–83. 
365. Id. at 84. 
366. Id. at 85. 
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This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding.367 
Out of the Supremacy Clause came various forms of federal preemp-
tion, including conflict preemption.368  Conflict preemption works to protect 
federal laws by estopping, “state laws that under the circumstances of the 
particular case stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objective of Congress.”369  Conflict preemption does 
not serve as an outright ban on all state legislation in a particular area, only 
that which is in direct interference with federal law.370 
The FCC, in arguing that the Preemption Directive should be upheld, 
reasoned that application of conflict preemption to state laws interfering with 
RIFO would render the same, broad preemptory effect as the Directive.371  
The D.C. Circuit Court did not outright disagree with the Commission that 
the principle of conflict preemption, if applied to a conflicting state law, 
could render that law moot.372  However, the Court refused to uphold the 
broad Preemption Directive on this reasoning alone, finding that conflict 
preemption requires the court to perform a unique, fact-intensive analysis of 
the specific conflicting state or local law called into question and thus, cannot 
be used as a basis to block any and all legislation in a specific area.373  Con-
flict preemption requires the court to answer, “‘an issue incapable of resolu-
tion in the abstract,’ let alone in gross.”374  Thus, the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
 
367. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
368. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
369. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 81. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 81–82. 
374. Id. at 81. 
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ruling infers that if a conflicting state law were to be presented, it would not 
be subject to automatic preemption under the Directive, however it could 
still be preempted if, after analysis, a court found the law to impermissibly 
interfere with RIFO.375 
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause May Pose an Additional Federal 
Obstacle  
State laws in conflict with RIFO may face prohibition if challenged 
under the dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”).376  This doctrine is an im-
plied extension of the Commerce Clause which gives Congress the power to, 
“regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.”377  While the Commerce Clause grants Congress 
affirmative regulatory authority, under certain circumstances, “it imposes 
limitations on the States.”378  In South Dakota v. Wayfair (“Wayfair”), the 
Supreme Court enumerated the behaviors prohibited by the DCC as follows: 
“First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce 
. . . . [S]econd, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate com-
merce.”379  Of particular interest to the discussion here is whether Califor-
nia’s Senate Bill 822, if passed, could be found to violate the DCC by being 
unduly burdensome on interstate commerce; engaging in the second prohib-
ited behavior identified in Wayfair.380  
 
375. This distinction mirrors that which divides facial and as-applied challenges to Federal 
statutes.  Field Day, L.L.C. v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A ‘facial 
challenge’ to a statute considers only the text of the statute itself, not its application to the particular 
circumstances of an individual. An ‘as-applied challenge,’ on the other hand, requires an analysis 
of the facts of a particular case to determine whether the application of the statute” is unconstitu-
tional as applied to an individual). 
376. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Peculiar Case of State Network Neutrality Regulation, 37 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 659, 690 (2019). 
377. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
378. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018). 
379. Id. at 2091. 
380. This section provides a general description of the dormant Commerce Clause and a 
cursory overview of how the dormant Commerce Clause may preempt state law.  The description 
of the dormant Commerce Clause provided in this section does not delve into the intricacies of this 
clause or its application. 
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In determining whether an Arizona state law was unduly burdensome, 
the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church (“Pike”) focused on the relation-
ship between the burden imposed by the law and the local interests it 
served.381  There, the law mandating specific packaging for cantaloupes and 
other produce transported out of the state was challenged by California as 
being unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.382  In analyzing Califor-
nia’s claim, the Supreme Court laid out the following rule to be used in in-
terpreting the burden of a particular state law: “Where the statute regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits.”383  The Supreme Court ultimately found that Arizona’s 
interest in, “meet[ing] certain standards of wholesomeness and quality,” in 
an effort to uphold the states reputation in the produce industry, was insuffi-
cient to justify the burden its law imposed on interstate commerce.384  Many 
subsequent cases have found that otherwise valid enactments under a state’s 
police power were too burdensome on interstate commerce and hence invalid 
under the DCC.385 
Turning now to California’s Senate Bill 822, a description of the bur-
den this law has the potential to impose on interstate commerce will first be 
presented and then weighed against California’s putative interest in enacting 
it.  
a. Senate Bill 822’s Potential Burden on Interstate Commerce 
Traditionally, Internet services have been treated as interstate ser-
vices.386  This is evident from the exclusive regulation of the Internet by the 
Federal Government since it came into existence.387  The D.C. Circuit court’s 
 
381. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
382. Id. at 138. 
383. Id. at 142. 
384. Id. at 142–43. 
385. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976); Kassel v. Consol. 
Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 678 (1981). 
386. Nachbar, supra note 376, at 689. 
387. Id. 
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new ruling may have changed that, appearing to open the door to state regu-
lation in this area, at least marginally.388  However, how states will be able 
to regulate Internet services given the fundamentally interstate nature of the 
Internet is unclear.389  While California’s law applies only to those providers 
who serve Californians, the Bill fails to appreciate that the ISPs transmitting 
these services may do so from across state lines.390  This ambiguity is de-
scribed by Williams in his dissenting opinion in Mozilla.391  Williams points 
out that the inseparability of interstate and intrastate transmissions of Internet 
services make it unlikely that ISPs will distinguish between them, causing 
these providers to apply the most stringent state regulation nation-wide and 
abandoning RIFO.392  Williams’ factual view seems valid.  Thus, Califor-
nia’s Bill in practice could effectively regulate out-of-state conduct, conduct 
which the state does not possess, “a legitimate interest in regulating.”393  Fur-
thermore, the behavior which California’s law seeks to prevent, namely 
blocking and prioritization, can take place at various points along the journey 
from ISP to consumer, meaning that enforcement of the law within the state 
alone is not likely to render the desired result.394  If passed, California’s Bill 
will impose some degree of burden on interstate commerce; however, 
whether this burden is unconstitutional requires further analysis. 
b. Putative Local Benefits of Senate Bill 822 
For California’s law to be upheld under the standard set forth in Pike, 
its putative local benefit must outweigh the burden it causes interstate com-
merce.395  In addressing the putative local benefit of a specific law, courts 
 
388. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
389. Nachbar, supra note 376, at 690. 
390. California Internet Consumer Protection and Neutrality Act of 2018, S. 822, 2018 
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); see also Nachbar, supra note 376, at 692 (explaining that Senate Bill 
822 will likely apply to out-of-state ISPs). 
391. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 97 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
392. Id. 
393. Nachbar, supra note 376, at 690. 
394. Id. at 691–92. 
395. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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look to the benefit that the legislation purports to advance.396  Whether this 
benefit is ultimately realized is not of consequence to this analysis.397  In-
stead, it only matters that the legislature, in passing the law, acted on the 
assumption that it would confer such benefits.398  If a putative benefit exists, 
this purported benefit must outweigh the law’s burden on interstate com-
merce.399  If it does, then the court will uphold the law and any future pre-
clusion will be dependent on Congress who may still enact legislation which 
directly preempts the state law in question.400 
 Section I of Senate Bill 822 sets forth the purpose underlying this law, 
providing that it will “protect and promote the safety, life, public health, pub-
lic convenience, general prosperity, and well-being of society, and the wel-
fare of the state’s population and economy, that are increasingly dependent 
on an open and neutral Internet.”401  California’s legislature goes on to state 
that “[a]lmost every sector of California’s economy, democracy, and society 
is dependent on the open and neutral Internet.”402  The sectors enumerated 
as those protected by Senate Bill 822 include: “police and emergency ser-
vices”; “[h]ealth and safety services and infrastructure”; “[e]ducation”; and 
“[b]usiness and economic activity.”403  Police and fire personnel, for exam-
ple, depend on the Internet to transmit real time alerts, informing them of 
emergencies.  Senate Bill 822 ensures that these alerts will not be slowed or 
otherwise blocked by the ISP servicing these professionals. 
If California’s law is challenged under the DCC, the State should focus 
on advancing how the Bill’s benefit to public safety—by protecting police, 
first responders, and more—outweighs its consequential burden on interstate 
commerce.  In Mozilla, the D.C. Circuit Court remanded the portion of RIFO 
 
396. Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence, 98 F. Supp. 3d 408, 417 (D.R.I. 2015). 
397. Id. 
398. Id. 
399. Id. 
400. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Con-
stitutional Balance of Federalism, DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987). 
401. California Internet Consumer Protection and Neutrality Act of 2018, S. 822, 2018 
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
402. Id. 
403. Id. 
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in which the FCC addresses public safety concerns, finding that the FCC had 
failed to adequately address this issue.404  Based on the importance the D.C. 
Circuit has placed on these concerns, California’s law is more likely to sur-
vive a DCC challenge if public safety is emphasized.405  This determination 
is, however, ultimately at the discretion of the court.  While it seems Cali-
fornia may succeed in arguing that its Bill confers a substantial putative ben-
efit to its residents, Senate Bill 822’s potential to regulate out-of-state com-
merce is not likely to be overlooked.406  If Senate Bill 822 is ultimately found 
to violate the DCC, this does not mean that California is out of options.  By 
acting as a market participant under an exception to the DCC, California may 
be able to offer its own broadband services to those living in the state without 
facing federal preemption or prohibition.  
C. Cities Takeover as ISPs, Distributing Internet Service as a Utility 
If you cannot beat them, join them. As illustrated by this old adage, 
state and local governments, if unsuccessful in their efforts to replace Net 
Neutrality by regulation, may want to consider engaging in the provision of 
municipally-owned broadband services.407  Local governments are com-
posed of publicly held officials who are more responsive to the concerns of 
their citizens than are privately-held corporations who can take their business 
elsewhere.408  This public-control makes government’s less susceptible to the 
financial incentives which may motivate privately-owned ISPs to engage in 
the blocking, throttling and prioritization of content.409  Thus, by creating 
their own infrastructure capable of offering Internet services, state and local 
 
404. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (majority opinion). 
405. See id. at 59–63. 
406. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (setting forth the rule to apply 
in ascertaining whether a law unduly burdens interstate commerce). 
407. David Z. Morris, Could Threats to Net Neutrality Spark Interest in Local Broad-
band?, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/12/28/net-neutrality-municipal-broad-
band/ [https://perma.cc/F5CE-8JQP]. 
 
408. Id. 
409. See generally id. 
YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/20  12:27 PM 
2020] CALIFORNIA, ARE YOU THERE? 303 
governments have the ability to provide their citizens with an alternative ser-
vice to that offered by ISPs.410  This alternative service has the ability to 
create a local market which is not guarded by financial barriers to entry, giv-
ing start-ups with limited financial resources the opportunity to offer their 
services to consumers online without being edged out by competition from 
industry giants with deeper pockets and limitless resources.411  Importantly, 
this solution is less likely to face preemption, or prohibition by the Federal 
Government than the adoption of state-specific Net Neutrality laws.412 
1. State and Local Governments May Participate in the Market as 
Competitors 
The DCC, which prohibits states from enacting laws that “discriminate 
against or impose an undue burden on interstate commerce,”413 does not pre-
vent state and local governments from competing with private businesses by 
offering their own equivalent goods and services to consumers.414  By choos-
ing to do so, these entities fall under an exception to the DCC known as the 
market participant doctrine.415  The market participant doctrine distinguishes 
states as regulators of a market from states as participants in a market.416 
State and local governments operating as market participants under this 
exception are treated, in many respects, as private businesses by the Supreme 
Court.417  This distinction originates with the Supreme Court’s ruling in New 
 
410. Adam Sneed, What Can Cities and States Do About Net Neutrality?, CITYLAB (Dec. 
15, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2017/12/what-can-cities-and-states-do-about-net-
neutrality/548546/ [https://perma.cc/3SAL-2JYK]. 
411. See generally id. 
412. See generally id. (presenting municipally owned broadband as an alternative to other 
preempted solutions to Net Neutrality’s repeal). 
413. David S. Bogen, The Market Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543 (2006). 
414. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 
U.S. 330, 342 (2007). 
415. Bogen, supra note 413, at 552. 
416. Id. at 546. 
417.  New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946). 
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York v. United States.418  There, the Supreme Court held that New York, by 
bottling and selling water, could not enjoy “sovereign” immunity from fed-
eral taxes as it would have otherwise had it been providing government-re-
lated services.419  New York, deciding to engage in the water-bottling busi-
ness, was treated the same as any other privately-held business.420  
Furthermore, in the Supreme Court’s later decision rendered in United Haul-
ers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the 
Court found that states may make their provision of services to consumers 
conditional, much like any private business can.421  In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that flow ordinances put in place by the defendant, a government 
entity, did not violate the DCC because the defendant provided its own 
county-wide waste management services.422  By restricting its own services 
through the imposition of these flow ordinances, the defendant was subject 
to the same constitutional limitations it would have been, had it been acting 
in its capacity as a state when imposing these same regulations on third par-
ties.423 
The market participant doctrine allows state and local governments 
who compete with other privately-owned businesses to restrict their own 
provision of goods and services without violating the Commerce Clause.424  
When these governments act as market participants, they are able to operate 
their business much like any other competitor is able to operate theirs.425  
States acting under the market participant exception are in no way exempt 
from federal law and are still subject to regulation by Congress in the same 
way that private businesses are.426  However, the constitutional limitations 
which would ordinarily block certain behaviors by the state, in the interest 
 
418. See id. at 582. 
419. Id. at 575. 
420. Id. at 579. 
421. 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007). 
422. Id. at 343–44. 
423. Id. 
424. Bogen, supra note 413, at 543. 
425. Id. 
426. Id. at 545. 
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of preserving the balance of power between the state and federal govern-
ments, do not apply.427 
Furthermore, precedent supports that courts are less likely to find that 
implied preemption precludes state ordinances put in place by states acting 
as market participants.428  Federal law may expressly or impliedly preempt 
state law.429  Express preemption occurs when the language of the federal 
law includes phrases which explicitly indicate the law is intended to preempt 
state law regulating the subject matter in question.430  In contrast, implied 
preemption “focus[es] on Congress’s intent,” where the federal law in ques-
tion does not contain explicit language precluding state regulation of the sub-
ject matter.431  There are two subcategories of implied preemption, one of 
which is conflict preemption (described above as a potential bar to state reg-
ulation of Internet services).432  Thus, if California acts as a market partici-
pant in providing broadband services, courts could be less likely to find the 
state’s regulation of this service precluded by conflict preemption.  However, 
if Congress were to pass a law which explicitly prohibits states from regu-
lating broadband, California would be expressly preempted from doing so 
regardless of whether it does so when acting as a market participant. 
The Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in City of Bur-
bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal (“Burbank”) illustrate how local govern-
ments engaged in the regulation of a privately-owned commodity are differ-
entiated from local governments engaged in the regulation of one that is 
municipally-owned in that they are not barred by a finding of implied 
preemption.433  In this case, the Court found that Burbank’s imposition of an 
ordinance which restricted air travel between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 
7:00 a.m. was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“Aviation 
 
427. Id. 
428. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 634 (1973). 
429. JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45825, FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 2 (2019). 
430. Id. 
431. Id. at 17. 
432. Id. at 2. 
433. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 634; id. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Act”), which outlawed state and local regulation of aircraft noise.434  In its 
reasoning, the Court referred to the Senate and House reports on the Aviation 
Act which stated, in pertinent part, that this act was intended to preempt state 
and local regulation of aircraft noise but not to preempt regulation by private 
airport operators.435  In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the major-
ity’s emphasis on this differentiation inferred that, had the local government 
owned the airport,436 they would not have been preempted by the Aviation 
Act from regulating aircraft noise.437 
2. California May Be Well-Suited to Implement This Solution 
If state and local governments are able to erect their own infrastructure, 
or purchase or condemn438 the infrastructure necessary to transmit Internet 
services, they will be able to offer an Internet alternative to their citizens.  
This Internet alternative is capable of providing consumers with a user ex-
perience untailored by the financial incentives of their ISP while providing 
small, online businesses with a market that is not guarded by financial barri-
ers to entry.439  If they choose to do so,  judicial precedent supports that state 
and local governments will be able to structure their provision of these ser-
vices without facing federal preemption.440  As supported by the Court’s rea-
soning in Lockheed, state and local governments regulating the provision of 
 
434. Id. at 625–33 (majority opinion). 
435. Id. at 634. 
436. Hollywood-Burbank Airport Authority President William B. Rudell Signing Docu-
ments 1977, BURBANK IN FOCUS (Jan. 7, 2017), https://burbankinfocus.org/islandora/object/is-
landora%3A1263 [https://perma.cc/4E4X-J3AX] (providing that in 1997, four years after the deci-
sion in Burbank was rendered, the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena purchased Lockheed 
Air Terminal together and began operating it as a public air terminal). 
437. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
438. Local government’s condemnation power would likely be adequate for this purpose.  
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding that the city’s condemnation of land 
owned by unwilling sellers did not violate the Takings Clause because it was taken to benefit the 
public).  State and local governments seeking to avoid the high installation costs of Internet services 
infrastructure may consider making a similar argument in favor of condemnation. 
439. See generally Sneed, supra note 410. 
440. See City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 634 (majority opinion). 
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municipally-owned Internet services in their area are likely to be more suc-
cessful than they would be attempting to regulate ISPs.441  Contract re-
strictions, which have the same practical effect as regulation, could not only 
serve to protect consumer access, but to place competitive pressure on the 
privately-owned ISPs serving their area to offer comparable services.442  In 
response to the growing interest in municipally-owned broadband across the 
states, ISPs have spent over $92 million dollars lobbying for regulations pro-
hibiting it.443  While twenty-five states have outlawed its practice, California 
has not.444  In fact, California has already begun providing broadband ser-
vices in certain contexts.445  Through the state’s creation of the K–12 High 
Speed Network, California provides broadband services to public schools 
and it plans to do the same for public libraries.446  Furthermore, the California 
Broadband Council, which was established by the California legislature in 
2010, and the California Broadband Cooperative are working to promote the 
provision of broadband services in, “unserved and underserved areas of the 
state.”447 Thus, it seems that California has begun taking steps towards the 
state-wide provision of broadband services.  As a state which has pioneered 
so many regulations which have expanded nationwide, California may be the 
best-suited candidate to implement this solution448 which at this time seems 
to be the most promising alternative to the reinstatement of Net Neutrality. 
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D. City-Wide Monitoring of Broadband Speeds to Increase ISP 
Accountability 
In the absence of Net Neutrality, monitoring where and when band-
width throttling occurs can help keep ISPs accountable.449  At this time, it is 
unclear what efforts the FCC will take to ensure ISP compliance with disclo-
sure laws.450  Thus, it will be up to consumers, private organizations, and 
state and local governments to monitor broadband speed and notify the FCC 
when Providers have failed to issue proper disclosures.451 
Cities control  the service agreements they enter into with ISPs to ser-
vice those living in their area.452  Thus, cities that collect “quality information 
on Internet speeds across neighborhoods” can use this information to put 
pressure on their Internet service providers.453  If ISPs engage in unwanted 
blocking or data throttling behaviors, cities can decide to terminate the pro-
vider and receive services from a competitor.454  Cities have taken action 
against ISPs providing unsatisfactory services before.455  In New York v. 
Charter Communications (“Charter Communications”), the City of New 
York sued Spectrum, an Internet provider, for misrepresenting its Internet 
speeds after an investigation prompted by thousands of consumer complaints 
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revealed that the provider “falsely advertise[d] Internet speeds beyond its 
capability.”456  Ultimately, New York won.457 
State consumer protection laws, like those which prohibit fraud, are not 
generally preempted by federal economic regulation.458  For example, in 
Charter Communications, the court found that the FCC’s Transparency 
Rule, which requires providers to report honest information regarding the 
cost and speed of their Internet services,459 did not preempt New York State 
consumer protection laws.460  Here, the court found that Spectrum’s compli-
ance with the Federal Transparency Rule did not make it exempt from com-
pliance with state laws governing “‘fraud, deception, and false advertising 
. . . .’”461  However, previous attempts by California to create regulations 
which require disclosure have been subject to preemption.462  Thus, if Cali-
fornia attempts to create regulations that require citizens to disclose their 
broadband speed, the state may again be precluded.  California is more likely 
to be successful if it instead creates a voluntary reporting system from which 
the state is able to collect and analyze information provided by citizens who 
choose to report.  While this solution does not replace Net Neutrality, it of-
fers one alternative approach that allows states to maintain baseline control 
over the quality of Internet services being offered to their citizens. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Internet, as it exists today, could soon become victim to the dam-
aging effects of concentrated control and corporate greed.  ISP’s ability to 
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block, throttle, and prioritize content will stifle innovation in the online 
streaming service industry, ultimately harming small businesses and con-
sumers.463  With ISPs seemingly standing as the only party to benefit, con-
sumers, state and local governments, and private organizations need to begin 
asking: How does this repeal benefit me?464 
How the non-neutral net will affect consumers and online streaming 
services long-term is unknown at this time.465  But whether these changes 
mean that consumers will be unable to access their favorite content online,466 
or unable access breaking news when a natural disaster affects their area,467 
the principle is the same: an Internet without Net Neutrality is not an Internet 
which serves the American people.  Film and television provide society with 
a medium in which we may illustrate our current attitudes, fears, and fum-
bles.468  It is this creativity which forms the anthropological roadmap of hu-
man evolution.  With the D.C. Circuit Court upholding RIFO,469 and the suc-
cess of equivalent state Internet regulations unclear, proponents of net 
neutrality should begin inquiring into other ways to keep the Internet unre-
stricted and free.  Encouraging alternatives like municipal provision of 
broadband or city-wide broadband monitoring could be the only way to pre-
serve the Internet as a creative powerhouse which benefits all. 
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